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Those monitoring the effects of climate change agree that 
the pace of environmental transformation currently taking 
place in the Arctic is unprecedented. As this report shows, 
such changes provide opportunities for business in areas 
as diverse as energy extraction, shipping and tourism. But 
these opportunities will only be fully realised if the 
businesses involved are able to manage the substantial, 
and unique, risks which exist in the region. There will be 
winners and losers as the impacts of climate change 
continue to shape the Arctic future.
One thing that stands out most clearly from this report is 
the signifi cant level of uncertainty about the Arctic‘s future, 
both environmentally and economically. Some of the 
technologies that will help to shape that future, such as 
those involved in deep water drilling and ice management 
are already tried, while others are still in their infancy or 
yet to be developed. 
Risk management clearly has a critical role to play in 
helping businesses, governments and communities 
manage these uncertainties and minimise risks. However, 
to do so effectively requires the most up to date 
information to analyse and control risks; there is a clear 
need for sustained investment in Arctic research.
The ‘known-unknowns’ of the High North present 
particular challenges for those involved in exploration and 
extraction. The Arctic is a frontier unlike any other, and the 
industries and companies it attracts will need to develop 
and implement robust risk management systems to meet 
these challenges and manage both their carbon and 
environmental footprint on this pristine setting.
The environmenta l implications of further deve lopment 
of the region are signifi cant, reaching far beyond the 
immediate Arctic region itse lf. How, for example, w ill 
deve lopments in hydrocarbon exploration and 
extraction a lign w ith comm itments to reduce globa l 
greenhouse gas em issions and the need to increase our 
use of renewable energy?
As recent events have shown, deep water exploration can 
have devastating consequences on local environments. 
The ability to contain and manage the fall-out from 
disasters is affected by issues including access, support 
infrastructure and cross-border political and legal 
requirements. Given that several states have jurisdiction 
over different parts of the Arctic, it will become even more 
important to develop and agree clear governance 
frameworks to allow effective and co-ordinated responses 
to disasters.
This report explores how fl uctuations in energy prices have 
driven, and will continue to drive, the pace of exploration 
in the Arctic and the importance of both political stability 
and public support in attracting future investment. 
The businesses which will succeed will be those which 
take their responsibilities to the region’s communities and 
environment seriously, working with other stakeholders to 
manage the wide range of Arctic risks and ensuring that 
future development is sustainable. 
Richard Ward
CEO
Lloyd’s
fo rewo r d
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•  Rapid and disr uptive change in the Arctic envi r onment  presents uneven pr ospects fo r  
investment  and economic deve l opment
  Environmental changes, especially those linked to global climate change, are giving rise to a broad set of 
economic and political deve lopments. Sustainable realisation of the economic opportunities that result from these 
deve lopments depends on strong regulatory frameworks and corporate environmental stewardship. A ll across the 
Arctic, changes in climate w ill create new vulnerabilities for infrastructure and present new design cha llenges. 
•  The Arctic is l ike ly to at t ract substantia l  investment over  the coming decade, potentia l ly 
reaching $100bn o r  mo re 
  There is a w ide range of potential scenarios for the Arctic’s economic future, depending principally on local 
investment conditions and global commodity prices. Oil and gas, mining and the shipping industries w ill be the 
biggest drivers and benefi ciaries of Arctic economic deve lopment. Industries supporting these activities, such 
as fi sheries, aquaculture, tourism and scientifi c research, could also contribute to the longer-term economic 
sustainability of Arctic communities. Based on current trends, expected investment in the Arctic could reach $100bn 
or more over the next decade. However, given the high risk/potentially high reward nature of Arctic investment, this 
fi gure could be signifi cantly higher or lower.
• Signifi cant know ledge gaps across the Arctic need to be closed u rgent ly 
  Uncertainties and knowledge gaps exist around the nature of environmental change, the geological potential of the 
Arctic and environmental baselines, as well as seabed mapping, and how to deal with the risks of signifi cant Arctic 
industrial activity. Governments, research institutes, non-governmental organisations and businesses can help close these 
gaps, as a way of reducing risk and ensuring that deve lopment takes place w ithin sensible, defi ned, ecological limits. 
• Arctic conditions wil l  remain chal lenging and of ten unpredictable
  The Arctic will remain a complex risk environment. Many of the operational risks to Arctic economic development 
– particularly oil and gas developments, and shipping – amplify one another. At the same time, the resilience of the 
Arctic’s ecosystems to withstand risk events is weak, and political and corporate sensitivity to a disaster is high. 
•  The envir onmenta l  consequences of disasters in the Arctic are l ike ly to be worse than in 
other  regions
  While particular risk events – such as an oil-spill – are not necessarily more likely in the Arctic than in other extreme 
environments, the potential environmental consequences, diffi culty and cost of clean-up may be signifi cantly greater, 
with implications for governments, businesses and the insurance industry. Transborder risks, covering several 
jurisdictions, add further complications. 
• The po litics of Arctic economic deve l opment are cont r oversia l  and fl uid
  Given the Arctic’s iconic status and sensitive environment, Arctic development is often politically contentious, with 
sometimes opposing interests and perspectives between local, national and international levels. Political support for 
development will continue to represent an uncertainty for businesses seeking to invest in Arctic projects.
executive summa r y
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•  Gover nance f rameworks in the Arctic shou ld continue to deve l op in thei r  cu r rent  
direction and be reinfo rced where possible 
  There are major differences between regulatory regimes, standards and governance capacity across the Arctic states. 
The challenges of Arctic development demand coordinated responses where viable, common standards where 
possible, transparency and best practice across the north. These frameworks need to be in place to enable sustainable 
development and uphold the public interest.
•  Risk management is fundamenta l  fo r  companies to work safe ly, sustainably and 
successfu l ly in the Arctic
  Companies operating in the Arctic require robust risk management frameworks and processes that adopt best practice 
and contain worst case scenarios, crisis response plans and full-scale exercises. There are many practical steps 
businesses can take to manage risks effectively, including investing in Arctic-specifi c technologies and implementing 
best-in-class operational and safety standards, as well as transferring some of the risks to specialist insurers.
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Transformational change
The Arctic region is undergoing unprecedented and 
disruptive change. Its climate is changing more rapidly than 
anywhere e lse on earth. Rising temperatures are causing a 
retreat of sea ice and changes to seasonal length, weather 
patterns and ecosystems. These changes have prompted 
a reassessment of economic and deve lopment potential 
in the Arctic and are giving rise to a set of far-reaching 
political deve lopments. 
A lthough traditional Arctic products – mostly re lating to 
fi shing, sealing, whaling and trapping – have long reached 
global markets and been infl uenced by global demands, 
before the 20th century the overall role and scale of the 
Arctic in the global economy was minimal i. The population 
of the Arctic – comprising the Arctic areas of Canada, 
Denmark (Greenland), Finland, Ice land, Sweden, Norway, 
Russia and the United States – is approximate ly one- 
twentieth of one per cent of the world’s total population. 
The combined effects of global resource depletion, climate 
change and technological progress mean that the natural 
resource base of the Arctic – fi sheries, minerals and oil 
and gas – is now increasingly signifi cant and commercially 
viable. At the same time, economic value is beginning to be 
attached to the Arctic natural environment, both for its role 
in regulating global climate and for its biodiversity. This is 
giving rise to prospecting for commercially viable biological 
processes and materials1. The w ind and hydro-power 
potential of some parts of the Arctic is be ing explored. The 
region is attracting a grow ing number of tourists. Shipping 
activity has expanded and intercontinental shipping, though 
several decades from reaching anything approaching the 
scale of existing major shipping routes, is a deve loping 
commercial reality.
Different regional and global economic scenarios suggest a 
range of possible future trajectories for Arctic deve lopment. 
Key uncertainties over future environmental conditions 
and the scale and accessibility of Arctic natural resources 
are compounded by uncertainty about the pace of 
technological deve lopment, the price of hydrocarbons, 
the future shape and demands of the global economy, 
and the political choices of Arctic states. Environmental 
disaster – whether due to a single event, or as a cumulative 
result of increased economic activity – could rapidly and 
The combined effects of global resource depletion, 
climate change and technological progress mean 
that the natural resource base of the Arctic is now 
increasingly signifi cant and commercially viable.
in t r oduction: Change, Unce r tain ty and 
Risk in the A rctic
i A lthough its mineral wealth was we ll known, the Arctic only became a signifi cant factor 
in oil production in the second half of the 20th century, w ith the deve lopment of the 
Prudhoe Bay fi e ld in northern A laska. 
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signifi cantly change the Arctic’s political and economic 
dynamics. Still more acute ly than e lsewhere in the world, 
economic deve lopment and environmental sustainability in 
the Arctic are co-dependent.
If current patterns continue, however, investment in the 
Arctic could potentially reach $100bn or more over the next 
ten years, large ly in the deve lopment of non-renewable 
natural resources, and in infrastructure construction and 
renewal ii. For some, this prospect represents a substantial 
business opportunity. But it also brings a unique and 
complex set of risks, and raises signifi cant policy dilemmas.
One Arctic, many Arctics
The Arctic can be defi ned in different ways. Often, the term 
is taken to refer to the Arctic Ocean alone or, as in the 
defi nition of the International Maritime Organisation, a part 
of it. Sometimes, it denotes both land and sea north of the 
Arctic Circle (66°N), though Arctic countries themselves often 
defi ne Arctic areas as being north of 60°. Other delimitations 
of the Arctic include those determined by temperature or the 
extent of vegetation. ‘Arctic conditions’, notably the presence 
of sea ice and icebergs, can occur in strictly sub-Arctic areas, 
such as off Sakhalin, in Russia’s Far East, or in the Baltic Sea, 
or off the coast of Newfoundland. 
All of these defi nitions cover a different area of the Northern 
Hemisphere. This report uses a broad defi nition of the Arctic, 
corresponding most closely to that used by the Arctic states 
themselves. This encompasses land and sea areas north of 
60° for the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, Sweden 
and Finland, and the whole of Greenland and Iceland.
In the end, however, there is not one Arctic, but many. 
Environmental conditions, geological prospectivity, physical 
accessibility, population levels, economic development and 
political salience all vary. The balance of risk and opportunity 
for major Arctic development projects depends on a range 
of further factors: 
•  For oil and gas developments, there is a key distinction 
between onshore and offshore developments, between 
shallow water offshore and deep water offshore, and 
between developments close to existing pipelines and 
transport infrastructure and those that would require the 
construction of entirely new pipelines and infrastructure. 
ii Projections of investment in the Arctic are highly speculative. This fi gure is based on 
a conservative assessment of a range of projections and statements from companies, 
consultancies and the authors’ best estimate of like ly and unlike ly deve lopments. The 
fi gure should provide an indication of scale, rather than a defi nite prediction. 
iii The Arctic Council is a consultative body comprising the e ight Arctic states, a number 
of non-voting permanent participants (notably, organisations representing the Arctic’s 
indigeneous populations), and both permanent and ad hoc observers.
•  For Arctic shipping, the w ide ly varying quality of 
seabed mapping in different parts of the Arctic, and 
disparities in port infrastructure, surve illance and 
search and rescue capability, create an uneven matrix 
of risk and opportunity. 
•  The Arctic is not – nor is it like ly to become – a 
truly single regulatory space, even while the Arctic 
Council, Arctic states and other interested parties are 
increasingly forging common approaches to shared 
challenges iii.
End of the frontier? 
The Arctic has long been considered a frontier. However, 
in some places, and for some projects, that is no longer 
the case. O il has been produced continuously onshore in 
the Arctic for severa l decades. Offshore drilling fi rst took 
place in the Arctic in the 1970s. Many of the technologies 
necessary for w ider Arctic deve lopment are a lready 
used in other parts of the world w ith sim ilar conditions. 
However, cumulative ly, the large-sca le deve lopment of 
the Arctic represents a unique and rapidly evolving se t of 
risks. The management of these risks w ill de term ine how 
– and whe ther – the opportunities of Arctic deve lopment 
are rea lised. 
Comprehensive and rigorous risk management is 
essential for companies seeking to invest in the Arctic. 
Those companies that can manage the ir own risks, 
using technologies and services most adapted to Arctic 
conditions, are most like ly to be commercially successful. 
A long-term and comprehensive regulatory approach – 
incorporating national governments, bodies such as the 
Arctic Council, and industry bodies – is necessary for 
effective risk management, mandating cross-Arctic best 
practices and defi ning public policy priorities on what 
constitutes appropriate deve lopment.
This current report has three main parts. The fi rst assesses 
Arctic environmental change, and its immediate prospects 
and consequences. The second looks at the economic 
potential of the Arctic, the politics of the Arctic, and critical 
uncertainties underlying different possible Arctic futures. 
The third outlines the full range of risks – from both a 
corporate and a public policy perspective – and assesses a 
number of potential responses. 
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From an environmental perspective, 
there is not one Arctic, but many 2. 
Conditions at similar lines of latitude 
can be starkly different. 
On an average day in January, the minimum temperature in 
Tromsø in northern Norway w ill be minus 6.7°C iv. A little to 
the south and considerably to the east, in Salekhard, capital 
of Russia’s Yamal-Nenets district and focus of Russia’s 
Arctic natural gas prospects, it w ill be minus 29.7°C. In 
Tiksi, on the east Siberian shore line, it w ill be colder still: 
minus 36.7°C. Across the Bering Strait and far inland, the 
temperature in Fairbanks, A laska w ill be minus 28.1°C. It 
w ill not be much different in Iqaluit, capital of Canada’s 
Nunavut territory. Meanwhile, in Nuuk, capital of Greenland 
and part of the kingdom of Denmark, it w ill be re lative ly 
warm: around minus ten degrees.
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iv A ll fi gures from the World Meteorological Organisation, which in turn depends upon 
national reporting organisations, which may calculate averages slightly differently. The 
fi gures here are described as the mean daily minimum for January and the mean daily 
maximum for July. Available at: http:/ /worldweather.wmo.int/
Figure 1. Map of the Arctic and shipping routes
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Temperatures in July w ill be similarly varied: from a 
maximum temperature on an average day of 8.7°C in 
Tromsø to 22.4°C in Fairbanks. The range from average 
daily minimum in January to average daily maximum in 
July is less than 20 degrees in Tromsø, representing a 
re lative ly temperate and stable climate. In Salekhard, Tiksi 
and Fairbanks, the sw ings between w inter and summer are 
much greater: nearly 50 degrees. 
Temperature is only one indicator, and one determinant, of 
environmental diversity. This diversity is even greater for 
other conditions: rates of precipitation, the prevalence of 
sea ice in coastal areas and the presence of permafrost, 
forest or tundra. Most of Greenland is covered in year-
round ice, amounting to approximate ly 2.85 million cubic 
kilometres. Most of the rest of land in the Arctic is not.
What unites the Arctic, however, is the rate at which it is 
warming and the speed of change this implies for its natural 
environment as a whole – transforming the Arctic’s geography, 
ecosystems and how it re lates to the rest of the world. 
1.1 A rctic C l imate Change: G l oba l  
 Ea r ly-Wa r ning
The Arctic is not only warming – it is warming more rapidly 
than anywhere e lse on earth (see Figure 2) – acting as an 
early-warning signal for the globe. In 2011, annual near-
surface air temperatures over much of the Arctic Ocean 
were 1.5°C warmer than the 1981–2010 base line. Against 
an earlier base line 3, the differences in temperature, both 
on land and over water, are greater still. These data points 
form part of a much longer warming trend 4.
 
The feedback loops that explain this process are 
collective ly known as ‘Arctic amplifi cation’. Reductions 
in sea ice and snow cover are one factor: as the Arctic 
becomes less white it absorbs more heat and refl ects less. 
But there are also factors that re late to cloud and w ind 
patterns, themse lves affected by broader climate change, 
and the enhanced movement of moisture and heat from 
the equator towards the poles. 
Figure 2. Surface temperature anomalies compared to 1961-1990 baseline
Source: UK Met Offi ce5
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To the extent that some global climate change is locked in 
by current and past greenhouse gas emissions, the Arctic 
w ill continue to warm, and warm more quickly than the 
rest of the world, for the foreseeable future. Success in 
global climate negotiations under the UNFCCC v would not 
substantially alter that outlook over the next few decades. 
The Arctic is already undergoing a profound and hard-to-
reverse environmental state change. 
Temperature changes are refl ected in other data . In 
Barrow, A laska , 30 June 2011 marked the beginning of 
a record-breaking run of 86 days where the m inimum 
temperature stayed at or above freez ing (the previous 
record was 68 days in 2009) 6. A ll across the Arctic, 
summers have come earlier and lasted longer. Indigenous 
peoples who hunt on sea ice have noticed that the ice has 
become more unpredictable and that the hunting season 
has become shorter 7.
1.2 Sea ice Ret reat: Mo re than Meets the Eye 
The reduction in the extent of summer sea ice is the 
most high-profi le indicator of Arctic climate change. 
The processes driving this retreat are complex: sea ice 
dynamics, air temperature, sea temperature, weather 
patterns and the physical geography of the Arctic as an 
ocean enclosed by land all play a part. 
A lthough there is some variability in ice extent from year 
to year, and although the annual cycle of me lting and 
freezing continues, the overall downward trend in the 
September sea ice extent, recorded by the US National 
Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC) since 1979, is strong and 
unambiguous. Historical data from other sources – such as 
the number of days when particular harbours have been 
iced up or ice-free, or century-old ice records of scientifi c 
expeditions – support the picture of sharply reduced ice 
extent compared w ith earlier periods. 
In September 2011, the month when Arctic sea ice 
extent is typica lly at its lowest, ice coverage fe ll to a low 
of 4.33 m illion square kilome tres (1.67 m illion square 
m iles), some 2.38 m illion square kilome tres less than the 
1979–2000 average (see F igure 3) 8. The NSIDC records 
show ice extent lower in only one other year – 2007, 
when it reached 4.17 m illion square kilome tres. Using a 
slightly different me thodology, scientists at the University 
v United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Figure 3. Decline in average sea ice extent in September, 1979-2011
Source: National Snow and Ice Data Centre 
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of Bremen reported that Arctic sea ice extent actua lly 
reached a m inimum of 4.24 m illion square kilome tres on 
8 September 2011 – 27,000 square kilome tres be low the 
Bremen team ’s estimate for summer 2007 9. According 
to the ir estimates, Arctic sea ice cover last reached this 
m inimum 8,000 years ago. 
 
Dramatic as it is, the reduction in the extent of Arctic sea 
ice cover is only half the picture. Arctic ice is also both 
thinner and younger than previously. In the early 1980s, the 
NSIDC estimated that as much as 40% of Arctic September 
ice was more than fi ve years old. In 2011, that proportion 
had declined to 5%. This shift has important ramifi cations, 
both climatic (eg the dynamics of the ice cover) and socio-
economic (eg the location of multi-year ice has a signifi cant 
impact on the viability of various Arctic shipping routes).
 
Estimating ice thickness – and therefore the overall volume 
of Arctic ice – is more complicated than measuring surface 
ice extent. Ice thickness varies across the Arctic depending 
on a range of conditions, and cannot be continuously 
assessed. Most Arctic ice is constantly moving vi.
However, the picture built up by a combination of 
mode lling, on- and under-ice data collection from the 
Arctic and sate llite remote sensing suggests that Arctic ice 
thickness – and volume – is declining even more rapidly 
than ice extent. The monthly average ice volume estimated 
in September 2011 was 4,300 km3, 66% be low the mean for 
1979–2010 (see Figure 4) 10.
Ice extent, age and thickness are all re levant to the like ly 
future of Arctic sea ice. Recent research suggests that most 
mode ls have underestimated the importance of these 
and other factors in predicting the trajectory of Arctic ice 
extent12. Younger and thinner Arctic ice is more prone to 
me lting, and more prone to break-up – including by ships. 
The formation of sea ice w ill be affected by a re lative ly 
more open Arctic Ocean, as waves tend to become 
stronger and more frequent viii. In short, the less ice there 
is in one year, the harder it is for ice extent and volume to 
recover over the w inter months. The demise of Arctic sea 
ice – to the extent of ice-free Arctic summers – could be 
more abrupt than the trend lines suggest.
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Figure 4. Decline in average estimated sea ice volume, 1979-now  vii 
Source: Polar Science Center, University of Washington11 vii Shaded areas show one or two standard deviations from the trend. Error bars indicate 
the uncertainity of the monthly anomaly plotted once per year. 
viii The enclosure of the Arctic Ocean by the land masses of North America and Eurasia 
have tended to reduce the fetch of waves, and thereby lead to different sea ice dynamics 
to those around Antarctica. 
vi The exception to this is land-fast ice, which is sea ice that has frozen over shallow parts 
of the continental she lf. 
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box 1: An Ice-f ree A rctic Ocean? 
Projections of the date when the Arctic Ocean w ill 
fi rst be free of sea ice in summer have been brought 
forward in recent years. The 2007 IPCC report suggested 
that this might occur by the end of the 21st century. 
Since then the record of actual reductions in sea ice 
extent have led most scientists to conclude that the 
fi rst ice-free summer in the Arctic Ocean w ill be w ithin 
the next 25 to 40 years, while some claim it could 
conce ivably occur w ithin the next decade ix. Reductions 
in summer sea ice allow ing for essentially unimpeded 
maritime traffi c, w ill occur before the Arctic Ocean 
becomes fully ice-free in summer. 
The Arctic Ocean w ill continue to freeze up in w inter. 
Ice extent w ill remain unpredictable, hampering regular 
traffi c w ithout ice-capable vesse ls and complicating 
planning for oil and gas exploration. Sea ice w ill 
continue to be a challenge to navigation in large parts 
of the Arctic for much of the year, particularly where 
broken ice clogs narrow waterways, or where sea ice 
is fl ushed out of the Arctic through the Davis and Fram 
Straits. In some places, climate change may result in an 
acce lerated rate of calving of icebergs from glaciers, 
which w ill in turn increase the number and size of 
icebergs x. This is like ly to present additional challenges 
for maritime activity on the sea surface and raise the 
risk of scouring along the seabed xi.
1.3 Ecosystems on the edge 
As the prevailing environmental conditions in the Arctic 
change, so do the living ecosystems adapted to those 
particular conditions. 
Some benefi t from climate change: at the bottom of the 
marine food chain primary production by phytoplankton in 
the Arctic increased by 20% between 1998 and 2009 (and 
the increase has been as much as 70% in the Kara Sea and 
135% in the Siberian sectors of the eastern Arctic Ocean) 13. 
On land, the Arctic is becoming increasingly green. 
Some lose: walrus and polar bear populations have tended 
to decline because of reductions in sea ice, while ocean 
acidifi cation due to increased carbon dioxide uptake in 
warmer seas can harm some marine life and the fi sheries 
associated w ith them 14. Others adapt: some fi sh stocks 
have moved, and fl ourished, as a result of warmer waters. 
In the short term, cod stocks in the Barents Sea and off the 
coast of Greenland have become more productive, and 
have moved further north than ever. 
Over time, however, the impacts of climate change – and 
greater economic deve lopment – are more complex than 
identifying w inners and losers. As w ith sea ice, changes 
in ecosystems can be discontinuous and abrupt. Marine 
ecosystems inter-re late in previously unexpected ways. 
Northward-moving fi sh stocks inevitably alter the balance 
in the ecosystem into which they migrate, including out-
competing or preying upon established Arctic species 15. 
Some invasive species – introduced as a result of greater 
human activity – can destroy existing ecosystems. Though 
the impact of increased ocean noise from shipping on 
those is not clear, it is like ly to have a negative impact on 
marine mammals that use acoustics for prey location and 
navigation.
At the same time, air- and sea-borne pollution from the 
industrialised south, such as persistent organic pollutants 
(POPs), can pose a serious challenge to ecosystems that, in 
the Arctic, tend to be relatively simple, vulnerable and diffi cult 
to re-establish. The increasing rate of disruption to Arctic 
ecosystems makes the ir future structure increasingly hard 
to predict. It also makes establishing environmental baseline 
data – against which change is measured and potential future 
changes are assessed – even more important. 
1.4 New  Access, New  Vu l ne r abi l ities
Over the next few decades the trend towards more ice-free 
areas of the Arctic Ocean, and longer ice-free periods, is 
expected to continue. This w ill improve sea-borne access 
ix There is a wide range of projections for when the fi rst ice-free Arctic summer will occur. 
See, for example, Muyin Wang and James E. Overland, ‘A sea ice free summer Arctic within 
30 years?’, Geophysical Research Letters, Vol. 36, 2009; and Julienne Stroeve, Marika M. 
Holland, Walt Meier, Ted Scambos and Mark Serreze, ‘Arctic sea ice decline: Faster than 
forecast’, Geophysical Research Letters, Vol. 34, 2007. The most aggressive projections 
suggest this could occur before 2020 (see, for example, Professor Wieslaw Maslowski, 
Naval Postgraduate School, or Professor Peter Wadhams, University of Cambridge). 
x Calving occurs when an iceberg breaks off from an ice-she lf (in the Antarctic) or from a 
glacier as it runs into the sea (for example, off the coast of Greenland). 
xi Scouring occurs when the bottom of a glacier drags along the seabed. In re lative ly 
shallow waters this is potentially a risk for sub-sea infrastructure, such as cables, 
pipe lines and sub-sea oil and gas installations.
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to coastal areas that, for parts of the year, are currently 
e ither inaccessible or accessible only by heavy icebreakers, 
which are expensive to build, maintain and charter. The 
opening of the Arctic w ill reduce shipping costs where 
icebreakers are no longer needed, and extend exploration 
and drilling seasons for offshore oil and gas. 
The changes w ill be most noticeable in areas that are 
currently most ice-prone, off the coasts of Greenland, 
Canada and A laska and particularly along Russia’s northern 
coastline. Areas where sea ice is already less common – 
such as off the coast of northern Norway – w ill see a less 
radical shift. 
However, climate change w ill reduce the accessibility of 
many inland areas. A ll across the Arctic, changes in climate 
w ill create new vulnerabilities for infrastructure and present 
new design challenges. 
Existing infrastructure – buildings, bridges, roads, railways 
and pipe lines – built on permafrost w ill become more 
expensive to maintain as the permafrost layer across 
northern A laska, Canada and Russia becomes unstable. 
A shortening season for w inter roads (temporary roads 
carved out of snow or ice) is already creating access 
challenges for communities and mine sites across northern 
Canada 16. Winter road seasons for trave l across northern 
A laskan tundra have declined from over 200 days in the 
1970s to around 100 days in the early 2000s 17. People and 
some goods can be fl own in by air, albe it at considerable 
expense, but heavy machinery cannot.
Given conditions of rapid change in the physical environment, 
Arctic infrastructure will need to adapt to a much wider range 
of potential environmental conditions over the course of 
a multi-decade life 18. This means that all across the north, 
future infrastructure will have to conform to different 
technical specifi cations, and may be more expensive to 
build.
A good example of the double-edged consequences 
of climate change on access is the (sub-Arctic) port of 
Churchill in northern Manitoba, one end of the long-
promised ‘Arctic Bridge ’ from northern Canada to 
Figure 5. Increase in average number of ice-free days in the Beaufort Sea compared to rates of coastal erosion
Source: National Snow and Ice Data Center - courtesy of Irina Overeem, University of Colorado19
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Murmansk in northern Russia. While maritime access 
to Churchill has increased in recent years, creating the 
possibility of expanding sea-borne grain exports, the 
periodic thaw ing of permafrost on which the single-track 
railway line to Churchill is built can cause the track to 
buckle. This increases the risk of derailments, slows traffi c 
and sometimes halts it altogether. Millions of dollars have 
been spent on repairing the line, but the costs of upgrading 
it permanently would be much greater. 
There are challenges for coastal areas too. The number of 
open-water days in the Beaufort Sea north of A laska and 
northern Canada (see Figure 5) corre lates w ith increasing 
coastal erosion. The reduction in sea ice increases the 
distance over which waves gather strength – the ir ‘fetch’ – 
and increases the exposure of the coast. In low-lying areas 
of the Arctic – as e lsewhere – any rise in sea leve l puts 
coastal infrastructure at risk.
Finally, on land, climate change may increase the frequency 
of extreme weather such as high precipitation or hotter 
than average Arctic summers, raising the risk of events 
such as fl ooding or forest fi res 20. At sea, many expect 
warming to make Arctic storms more severe, posing a 
different set of challenges for Arctic shipping and additional 
risks for coastal infrastructure, including the increased risk 
of storm surge (see Figure 6) 21.
Ice storm tracks
1950-1972
Ice storm tracks
2000-2006
Figure 6. Arctic storm tracks xii
Source: Nasa
xii S. Hakkinen, A. Proshutinsky, and I. Ashik, ‘Sea ice drift in the Arctic since the 1950s’, 
Geophys. Res. Lett., 35, 2008
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box 2: G l oba l  Consequences of  A rctic 
Envi r onmenta l  Change 
As we ll as be ing affected by climate change, the Arctic 
itse lf a lso signifi cantly affects globa l environmenta l 
change. The Arctic is crucia l to globa l and regiona l 
weather patterns: anoma lously large w inter snow fa ll 
across Europe, North America and East Asia has 
been attributed to changes in Arctic sea ice 22. The 
feedback loops that contribute to ‘Arctic amplifi cation’ 
tend to acce lerate globa l warm ing, while me thane 
re lease from the me lting of both onshore and seabed 
permafrost may increase atmospheric greenhouse 
gas concentrations. Many of the uncerta inties in globa l 
climate mode ls – crucia l for de term ining appropriate 
policy responses – lie in Arctic processes. The 
importance of Arctic science to globa l climate science 
is shown in the greater priority given to polar science 
in recent years by both nationa l and internationa l 
research bodies. 
The main global consequence of Arctic environmental 
change is through a diminishing Greenland ice sheet. 
This is a long-term process. But, even over the course of 
the 21st century, it could have ramifi cations far beyond 
the Arctic. 
The Greenland ice sheet contains approximate ly 2.85 
million cubic kilometres of freshwater. Unlike annual sea 
ice me lt, only a tiny proportion of this overall volume 
me lts each year, and much of that is compensated for 
by fresh snowfall onto Greenland. However, also unlike 
w ith sea ice, any net reduction in the mass of ice on 
Greenland contributes directly to global sea leve ls xiii. 
Sate llite measurements indicate that the mass of ice on 
Greenland is indeed declining 23. 
For a range of reasons – including me ltwater lubrication 
of the underside of glaciers, feedback mechanisms and 
the general trend of global warming – the rate of decline 
is acce lerating 24. Total ice sheet loss in 2011 was 70% 
greater than the average of 2003–2009 25. The number 
of me lt days in 2011 was far above the average for 
1979–2010, particularly in western and north-western 
Greenland (see Figure 7). 
The rate of Greenland me lt – along w ith that of Antarctic 
ice-she lves – is one of the key drivers of global sea-
leve l rise. The infl ux of increased amounts of freshwater 
into the North Atlantic, meanwhile, could have broader 
consequences for heat carried by ocean currents 
which, in turn, could have consequences for weather 
patterns. And, although very far from immediate, there 
may be thresholds for the irreversibility of the decline of 
the Greenland ice sheet, meaning the original ice sheet 
volume could only be regained if the losses were no 
greater than 10–20% 27. 
Figure 7. 2011 deviation from mean number of 
melt days on Greenland over the period 1979-2010
Me lt day anomoly
-30 -20 -10 -0 +10 +20 +30
Source: City College of New York 26 
xiii The me lting of fl oating sea ice has no direct impact on sea leve l when it me lts 
because the displacement of sea is the same whether the water is in a liquid or 
frozen state.
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The economic future of the Arctic 
is poised between opportunity 
and uncertainty. 
Grow ing interest in four key sectors – m inera l resources 
(oil, gas and m ining), fi sheries, logistics (including 
shipping) and Arctic tourism – could generate investment 
reaching $100bn or more in the Arctic region over 
the next decade, mostly in the m inera ls sector 28. The 
epicentre of that investment is like ly to be in the Barents 
Sea area , north of Norway and Russia , and in northern 
A laska . Sma ller investments, but w ith ma jor loca l and 
internationa l consequences, could occur in Greenland, 
Canada and e lsewhere in the Arctic. A range of other 
econom ic activities – prospecting for biologica l materia l, 
harnessing Arctic hydro-power, and scientifi c research 
– may prove to be signifi cant dimensions of econom ic 
deve lopment in some parts of the Arctic, but are not 
discussed in depth here. 
Though the prospects are signifi cant, the trajectory and 
speed of Arctic economic deve lopment are uncertain. 
Some aspects of Arctic deve lopment – particularly in 
the mineral resource sectors – depend heavily on global 
supply and demand dynamics. Investment projections 
often re ly on a small number of mega-projectsxiv (such 
as the Shtokman offshore gas deve lopment, or offshore 
oil deve lopments in the South Kara Sea) which can be 
cance lled, de layed or scaled back depending on market 
conditions. For example, Arctic liquefi ed natural gas (LNG) 
projects w ill increasingly need to take into account North 
American shale gas production. Falling commodity prices 
would probably put many Arctic projects on hold. 
In the meantime, there are huge infrastructure and 
know ledge gaps across the Arctic, constraining 
deve lopment and increasing the risks of frontier projects. 
There may be perce ived trade-offs between different 
economic activities in the Arctic – such as between fi shing 
and offshore oil and gas. The political and regulatory 
conditions in the Arctic, shaped by local, national and 
global policy priorities, are subject to change. Geological 
risks are inherent in mineral exploration activity in the 
Arctic as e lsewhere (see Box 4). There are also additional 
risks, discussed in section 3 of this report; they range 
from a unique ly challenging range of operational 
risks, to the inevitable environmental risks caused by 
increased industrial activity and the constant possibility of 
environmental catastrophe w ith regional fall-out. 
2. Oppo r tunity and Uncer tainty: Char ting 
the Arctic’s Economic and Po litical  Futu re
Though the prospects are signifi cant, 
the trajectory and speed of Arctic 
economic deve lopment are uncertain.
xiv Mega-projects are large scale investment projects typically costing more than $1billion. 
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2.1 A rctic mine r a l  resou rces
Three key factors are sharpening interest in the Arctic’s 
mineral resources: 
•  Feasibility: Technological improvements mean that 
many more resource projects are technically feasible 
and commercially viable while geological risks can be 
better managed.
•  Commercial attractiveness: High commodity prices, 
coupled w ith uncertainty about access to resources 
e lsewhere in the world, make a far w ider range of 
potential Arctic projects attractive to investors. 
•  Access: Improving access to large parts of the Arctic 
reduces costs of operation and eases logistics. 
These factors are strongly inter-re lated and tend to be 
mutually re inforcing. They apply across the full spectrum of 
mineral resource projects – from oil and gas to mining.
2.1.1 Arctic oil and gas 
Resources and activity
The Arctic has been known to contain oil and gas for over 
two centuries. A petroleum reserve for the US Navy was 
established in northern A laska as early as 1923 xv.
However, commercial development is more recent. 
Discovery of the Prudhoe Bay fi eld sparked renewed interest 
in the North Slope of Alaska in the late 1960s. The fi rst oil 
shock of 1973, government support for domestic exploration, 
and concerns of international oil companies (IOCs) about 
being shut out of reserves in other parts of the world led to 
a decade-long boom in the US and Canadian Arctic in the 
1970s 29. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline opened in 1977 and North 
Slope production peaked a decade later. The exploration 
boom extended to Greenland in 1976–1977 with the drilling 
of fi ve offshore wells, which all turned out to be dry. 
Historically, activity in the European Arctic has been much 
lower. Exploration in the early 1980s in both the Norwegian 
and Russian Arctics resulted in a number of oil and gas 
fi nds, including Snohvit, Shtokman and Prirazlomnoye. In 
the 1990s, however, interest waned as new sources of 
oil and gas opened up and the oil price fe ll towards $10 
a barre l. Large-scale Arctic exploration and deve lopment 
halted – except in A laska, where the Trans-A laska pipe line 
made it commercially viable xvi.
 
Several factors have substantially affected commercial 
and strategic calculations of Arctic deve lopment over the 
last decade. The improvement of exploration, drilling and 
offshore production technologies has increased the likelihood 
of fi nding oil and gas in any given location, and allowed larger 
areas to be deve loped w ith fewer oil and gas installations. 
Globally, access for IOCs to easy-to-produce reserves has 
been reduced (see commercial rationales and risks be low). 
Finally, and crucially, the price of oil has increased. 
In 2008, the United States Geological Survey estimated 
that the Arctic contained some 412.2 billion barre ls of 
undiscovered oil and oil equivalent. Over two-thirds of this 
was estimated to be natural gas – approximate ly 46 trillion 
cubic metres, representing 30% of global undiscovered 
natural gas (approximate ly equivalent to Russia’s entire 
current proven reserves of natural gas 30). Some 90 billion 
barre ls were estimated to be oil – 13% of the estimated 
global total of undiscovered oil, approximate ly three times 
the current total proven reserves of oil of the United States 
and more than three times the proven reserves of the 
world’s largest non-state oil company, ExxonMobil. 
The balance of oil and gas across the Arctic w ill vary. 
In general, the Russian Arctic is considered to be more 
gas-prone and the offshore Norwegian and American 
Arctics (including Greenland) more oil-prone 31. Most Arctic 
hydrocarbon resources are like ly to be on the near-shore 
continental she lves of the Arctic states. 
A ll these estimates are highly uncertain. Drilling data is 
scarce re lative to highly deve loped areas such as the North 
Sea or the Gulf of Mexico. A comparison of the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate estimates for undiscovered oil in the 
North, Norwegian and Barents Seas shows the range of 
uncertainty around prospective oil resources in the Arctic is 
signifi cantly greater than e lsewhere (see Figure 8). 
xv The National Petroleum Reserve A laska (NPRA) was initially the National Petroleum 
Reserve, established by order of President G. Harding in 1923. 
xvi Seismic work continued in some areas – for example in offshore Greenland in the 1990s. 
Figure 8. Range of estimates for undiscovered 
hydrocarbon resources in the North, Norwegian and 
Barents Seas
Source: The Resource Report 2011, Norwegian Petroleum Directorate October 2011
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Figure 9. Current and potential future Arctic offshore hydrocarbons map
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The mean estimate for the Barents Sea in 2011 was 6 billion 
barre ls of oil equivalent 32. Over the course of a single year, 
w ith the announcement of the Skrugard oil fi nd in January 
2011 and the Havis oil fi nd in January 2012, Statoil reported 
Barents oil fi nds amounting to 400–600 million barre ls of 
recoverable oil equivalents.
Commercial rationales and risks
As e lsewhere, geological uncertainties affect investment 
decisions in the Arctic. But, from a corporate perspective, 
geological uncertainty is partly offset by the prospect of 
discovering large fi e lds – unlike ly to be found in other parts 
of the world – that would justify large exploration expenses. 
The share valuation of IOCs is large ly driven by the ratio of 
proven reserves – which can be ‘booked’ in a company’s 
fi nancial reporting xvii – to production. For companies 
excluded from equity stakes in many of the prime resource 
bases of the world, and w ithin a diminishing range of 
investment options – including deepwater ones – the Arctic 
is increasingly attractive xviii.
Further, companies exploring in the Arctic can acquire the 
technical expertise they w ill later need for production there. 
The Arctic has typically been a long-term investment: lead 
times from discovery to production remain long and there 
is limited Arctic-ready equipment to engage in exploration 
activity. It took Statoil 30 years of exploration and drilling in 
the Barents Sea before production. The company expects 
its Arctic exploration and production w ill speed up the 
rate of subsequent discoveries and potentially reduce 
production lead times 33. 
The commercia lity of any project or technique is based 
on expectations of future marke t prices for oil and 
gas. Expectations that the price of oil w ill rema in in the 
$80–$120 range in rea l terms for the foreseeable future 
provide a strong incentive for exploration and increase 
confi dence that prices w ill cushion the high costs of Arctic 
deve lopment (see F igure 10). However, globa l energy 
marke ts are in fl ux. Severa l studies suggest the potentia l 
of a peak in globa l oil demand, rather than supply, leading 
to subsequent term ina l decline and lower prices 34. A 
susta ined oil price spike in the near term m ight acce lerate 
that process 35.
The outlook for Arctic natural gas is different. In the 
future, European Arctic gas can be expected to reach 
consumers by pipe line, partly through existing Russian 
or Norwegian networks, and partly to compensate for 
declining gas production e lsewhere in Europe and Russia. 
xvii The listing of reserves in a company’s fi nancial reporting is subject to strict regulation. 
xviii For example, national policies exclude fore ign investment in upstream oil in Saudi 
Arabia and do not allow the booking of reserves in Iran.
Arctic oil installation.
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The scope of this marke t is constra ined by the leve l of 
European demand. The Russian government intends to 
use Arctic production to a llow it to keep to its European 
comm itments while attempting to capture a part of the 
grow ing Asian gas marke t. 
The broader global dynamics of natural gas are shifting, 
however. Natural gas is priced and sourced regionally, 
often resulting in signifi cant price differences between 
markets – there are currently low natural gas prices in 
North America and high ones in East Asia. However, gas is 
increasingly marketed internationally in LNG form. Prices 
for gas could change dramatically if prices were decoupled 
from oil, or if there is a move towards a global price – as 
w ith oil – or if signifi cant new gas supplies come on-stream. 
Shale gas production in the US, for example, has already 
led companies to drop out of the $30–$40bn project to 
pipe gas from A laska ’s North Slope to US and Canadian 
marke ts 36. In Asian marke ts Arctic LNG would have to 
compe te w ith Austra lian and other Asian sources. In 
time, the continenta l United States may itse lf become 
a signifi cant exporter if natura l gas production is not 
diverted to its transport sector. 
There is considerable variation amongst Arctic hydrocarbon 
projects. This has implications for the ir commercial viability, 
and for the business, operational and environmental risks 
associated w ith deve loping them. The estimated cost of 
producing a barre l of Arctic oil ranges from $35 to $100 
(production costs in the Middle East are sometimes as little 
as $5 per barre l)xx.
There are different potential offshore deve lopments in both 
shallow water and deeper water. Some are in re lative ly 
inaccessible areas; others are in places w ith a history of 
oil and gas deve lopment. Some Arctic deve lopments are 
commercially viable at a re lative ly low oil price, particularly 
onshore, and especially where there are sunk costs in 
terms of infrastructure. Other Arctic deve lopments, such as 
offshore Greenland and the Barents Sea, w ith potentially 
higher production costs and a requirement for major 
infrastructure investment before deve lopment, need e ither 
a much higher price or a much larger fi nd to be profi table. 
The higher end of Arctic production costs is in line w ith 
current and projected oil prices for the next 10-15 years. 
However, given that lead times from prospecting to 
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Figure 10. Long-term oil supply cost curve
Source: International Energy Agency37 
xx This depends on the productivity of the we lls and the fi e ld, among other factors. 
xix MENA refers to the Middle East and North Africa; EOR refers to Enhanced Oil Recovery. 
These are engineering techniques to increase the amount of crude oil that can be 
extracted from a fi e ld. 
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production are approximate ly ten years, the commercial 
value of undiscovered fi e lds is far less certain. 
For the most commercially marginal Arctic oil and 
gas deve lopments, the tax regime applied may be a 
decisive factor in determining the ir viability. There is w ide 
variation in the government take of profi ts from Arctic 
projects, depending on government-set regimes, price 
and production costs. A recent study suggested that, 
at a sale price of $80 and a production price of $25, the 
government take for Arctic oil projects would range from 
100% in Russia (though this is changing) to 40–45% in 
Greenland and Canada xxi. As governments offer incentives 
for deve lopment, or as geological uncertainties are 
reduced, the government take is like ly to shift. The Russian 
government’s terms for Yamal’s LNG deve lopment are 
described as be ing “among the lowest in the world” xxii.
The UNFCC and its member states have publicly stated 
the ir commitment to meet a target of 2°C maximum 
temperature rise by 2020. A business-as-usual attitude to 
climate change w ill lead to a 4°C temperature rise, resulting 
in devastating impacts on people ’s lives and the global 
economy. To reach the 2°C target, the world’s leading 
economies w ill need to commit to a signifi cant increase 
in the ir use of renewable energy. Governments and 
companies should consider how the drive to deve lop Arctic 
oil and gas exploration w ill align w ith international action 
on climate change mitigation. 
Current and future Arctic oil and gas investments 
The sca le of potent ia l investment in both the onshore 
and offshore Arct ic o il and gas industry is a sma ll 
fract ion of overa ll investment in the globa l o il and gas 
industry over the next 10–20 years: the Interna t iona l 
Energy Agency has suggested tha t overa ll investment in 
the o il and gas sector shou ld tota l $20,000bn be tween 
2011 and 2035 38. Neverthe less, susta in ing current and 
pro jected ra tes of Arct ic o il and gas cou ld transform 
loca l econom ies and globa l energy dynam ics. If 
imp lemented , the Russian government’s amb it ious vision 
for investment in its h igh north wou ld estab lish the 
Arct ic as a ma jor gas-produc ing region .
Given regulatory, commercia l and geologica l uncerta inty, 
meaningful long-term investment projections in this 
sector are hard to come by and diffi cult to make xxiii. 
Each potentia l project faces a different se t of technica l, 
environmenta l and infrastructure issues: each country 
presents a different lega l and politica l context that w ill 
infl uence investment. Box 3 looks at current investment 
projections for each territory.
 
xxiii The offshore oil consultancy Infi e ld has projected an average $7 billion annual 
investment in offshore Arctic exploration and deve lopment alone from 2011 to 2017. But 
this fi gure depends to a large extent on the 2016 go ahead for the Shtokman gas fi e ld 
deve lopment in the Barents Sea, a partnership between Gazprom, Statoil and Total.
Oil pumps in the Arctic.
xxi Pedro van Meurs, Barry Rogers, Jerry Kepes, World Rating of Oil and Gas Terms: Volume 
3 – Rating of Arctic Oil and Gas Terms, Van Meurs Corporation Rodgers Oil and Gas 
Consulting & PFC Energy, 2011 (as reported in Petroleum Economist January 2012).
xxii ‘Arctic investment competition heats up’, Petroleum Economist, January 2012, available 
at www.petroleum-economist.com/Article/2959654/Arctic-investment-competition-
heats-up.html
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Box 3: A rctic oi l  and gas investment  
commitments and pr o jections
Russia
Shtokman is by far the largest single potential offshore 
Arctic project, 550 kilometres into the Barents Sea. 
Overall, investment could reach $50bn 39. However, 
the Shtokman project has been repeatedly de layed 
ow ing to concerns about drifting icebergs, negotiations 
over the tax regime w ith the Russian government, 
and concerns about export markets xxiv. At the time of 
writing it is unclear whether the project w ill proceed, 
or to what schedule. Investments in the onshore Yamal 
peninsula – the lifeline for Gazprom’s ability to maintain 
and increase Russia’s overall gas production – could 
run to more than $100bn, in order to provide eventual 
production of 115–140 bcm, if not more 40. In October 
2011, Total paid $425m for a 20% stake in Novatek’s 
Yamal LNG project – which is expected to require 
investment of $18–20bn to 2018 – while also taking a 
$4bn equity stake in Novatek 41. 
 
In oil, TNK–BP plans to spend up to $10bn on 
deve loping onshore Arctic oilfi e lds in the Yamal-Nenets 
Autonomous Area, w ith exports to Asia from 2015–
201642. Offshore, Gazprom’s Prirazlomnoye platform 
is expected to be in place in 2012. In August 2011, the 
Russian state company Rosneft signed a deal w ith 
Exxon for three offshore blocks in the Kara Sea and one 
in the Black Sea, to which Exxon committed $3.2bn for 
the initial prospecting phase – most of this tabled for 
the Arctic areas. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor 
Sechin said this project would attract $200bn–$300bn 
in direct investment over the next 10 years, though this 
fi gure is highly speculative 43.
No r way
Given the arguably more stable regulatory and operating 
environment, investment in Norway’s Arctic fi e lds is 
more predictable. The Norwegian government expects 
the Snohvit gas fi e ld (producing gas for the Me lkøya LNG 
plant) and the Goliat oil fi e ld (expected to produce from 
2013) to attract a total of $9.2bn of investment ($2.17bn 
has already been spent to 2010) 44. The Skrugard and 
Havis oil and gas fi e lds, estimated to contain 400–600 
million barre ls of recoverable oil equivalents, are like ly 
to produce sustained investment, w ith associated 
economic opportunities for oil service fi rms able to 
operate in the Barents Sea 45.
Canada
In Canada, there has been renewed interest in Arctic 
wells previously abandoned as unprofi table at the end 
of the 1980s. Several 9-year exploration leases were 
awarded between 2007 and 2010, subject to investment 
commitments of some $1.8bn. These projects have been 
on hold since May 2010 pending a review of offshore 
drilling (see section 3.3 and Appendix).
United States
In addition to on-going onshore oil production on 
the North Slope of A laska, US companies are now 
also looking further offshore, beyond artifi cial islands 
which have been producing in the near offshore 
for some time. She ll, ConocoPhillips, Statoil, Repsol 
and Eni won exploration leases for the Beaufort and 
Chukchi Seas in 2008, paying out a total of $2.66bnxxv. 
Subsequent legal challenges and the 2010 post-
Macondo moratorium on offshore drilling in Canada 
and the United States he ld exploration large ly in check. 
In 2011, a report commissioned by She ll estimated 
“commercial production of Arctic A laska offshore oil 
and gas resources would generate government revenue 
estimated at $97bn (in 2010 dollars) in the Beaufort 
Sea and $96bn in the Chukchi Sea over 50 years” 46. In 
line w ith an increasingly supportive approach taken 
by the Obama administration to Arctic deve lopment, 
in December 2011 She ll rece ived conditional federal 
approval for six exploratory we lls. 
G reen land
Between 2002 and 2010, hydrocarbon exploration 
costs in Greenland amounted to around $740m. A 
second licensing round for exploration acreage in the 
Greenland Sea w ill be he ld in 2012/2013. To date, Cairn 
Energy is the only company undertaking exploration; 
it has probably invested over $1bn in total to 2011, 
so far w ithout major success. Greenland’s national 
oil company, Nunaoil, has suggested the potential for 
$10bn in investment in the exploration-to-production 
phase in West Disko (2011–2030) and a further $10bn in 
Baffi n Bay (2011 to beyond 2040) 47. 
xxv She ll was by far the most substantial bidder, paying $2.1 billion.xxiv Other LNG supplies, from Australia and e lsewhere, may mean that the w indow of 
opportunity for Arctic LNG exports is becoming more challenging.
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2.1.2 Mining
Mining has a longer history than hydrocarbon production 
across the Arctic. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
the quality of Arctic coal deposits (the principal fue l of 
shipping) led to investment and interest in the Svalbard 
archipe lago, culminating in the Svalbard treaty in 1920 xxvi. 
For a long time, mining was Greenland’s only economic 
export activity besides fi shing. 
More recently, and w ith less publicity than the growth of 
oil and gas interest in the Arctic, mining companies have 
increased the ir investments in the region. In some cases, 
the risks associated w ith air and water pollution of rivers 
and streams have made these investments as controversial 
as oil and gas projects. However, mining projects often offer 
better long-term potential for economic deve lopment than 
oil and gas, w ith a larger permanent and local workforce 
and a project lifetime of several decades, from prospecting 
and production to closure and rehabilitation. 
Resources and activity
At the time of writing, there are currently 25 mines in 
operation in the Russian Arctic. These include the mines of 
Norilsk Nicke l, a large Russian diversifi ed mining company, 
the largest nicke l producer in the world and a major 
producer of palladium and platinum 48. In 2010, 36.8% 
of A laska’s fore ign (non-US) export earnings came from 
exports of zinc, lead, gold and copper, generating $1.3bn 49. 
The Red Dog mine is one of the largest lead-zinc mines in 
the world, employing 700 people, mostly year-round. 
Greenland is already home to a number of mines, such as 
Swedish company LKAB’s Seqi Olivine mine. The opening 
of coastal areas of Greenland to deve lopment, partly as 
a result of climate change, has increased the potential 
attraction of a range of other projects including gold, 
platinum and rare earth metals w ith high-technology 
applications at the Kvanefje ld deposit. Greenland’s 
government does not currently allow deve lopment of the 
island’s we ll-known uranium deposits, though its stance on 
exploration has recently been partially re laxed 50.
In Canada, mining accounts for half the income of the 
North-West Territories and geological mapping is strongly 
supported by the federal government 51. Diamond mining 
north of Ye llowknife has expanded rapidly. Between 2003 
and 2008, total spending at a single mine, the Diavik 
diamond mine, amounted to $4bn, of which a substantial 
share was w ith local businesses 52. The Mary River iron ore 
project on Baffi n Island in Canada’s Nunavut territory is due 
to enter deve lopment in 2013 and w ill require an estimated 
$4.1bn of direct investment up to 2040 53.
xxvi Broadly the Svalbard treaty confi rms Norwegian sovere ignty over the Svalbard 
archipe lago, but provides for access for treaty signatories (including Russia, the United 
Kingdom and others) on equal terms. 
Kovdor Mine, Russia.
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2.2 Fishe r ies 
Arctic fi sheries are often overlooked in assessments of the 
resource wealth of the Arctic; they currently only represent 
around 5% of the overall global catch 55.
 
Yet fi shing is historically a key industry – and employer – 
across the Arctic. Its economic relevance has been greatest 
in the smaller Arctic states. Fish represents 90% of the 
export earnings of Greenland, 33% of those of Iceland, 
approximately 6% of Norway’s and less than 1% of the 
export earnings of the United States and Russia 56. In 2011, 
exports of Norwegian cod amounted to $1.8bn, and exports 
of salmon from aquaculture some $4.8bn 57. Meanwhile, 
individual Arctic communities are almost wholly reliant on 
fi sheries and fi sh processing for their economic survival. 
Fishing communities are highly sensitive to marine pollution, 
they are often politically powerful in proportion to their 
size, and their interests may sometimes be at odds with 
other economic activities, including shipping and oil and 
gas development. For example, in Norway many fi shermen 
oppose opening up the area around the Arctic Lofoten, 
Vesteraalen and Senja islands to oil exploration given the 
likely disruption to spawning habitats and risk of spills.
In some places, fi shing activity has boomed in recent years. 
There were 30 fi shing ship voyages in the Canadian Arctic 
in 2005, and 221 in 2010, by far the largest component of 
all ship voyages in the Canadian Arctic 58. The Greenlandic 
shrimp catch has grown by half again over the last decade 59.
Historical data on Arctic fi sheries are uneven. While the 
Barents Sea has been relatively well studied, not least 
because of long-standing fi sheries co-operation between 
In northern Scandinavia, there are mining prospects across 
northern Sweden and Finland, and iron mines in Kirkenes 
(in northern Norway) and Kiruna. The latter is the world’s 
largest underground iron ore mine and the world’s largest 
Arctic mine – yet most of the ore is currently unmined 54.
Commercial rationales and risks
The reasons for mining company interest in the Arctic are 
broadly similar to those of oil and gas companies: the Arctic 
has been much less geologically explored than other parts 
of the world and consequently there is the potential for 
discovery of world-class deposits. However, the challenges 
and drawbacks are also similar: remoteness, lack of 
infrastructure and the potential of disruption to production 
schedules causing logistical bottlenecks and increasing 
costs. While maritime transport to mines may become 
easier, mining activity away from the coastline may become 
less accessible (see section 1.4). 
Politica l risk around m ining varies around the Arctic 
depending on the leve l and volatility of politica l support 
for m ining and the lega l regime under which it takes 
place. In some respects, however, politica l risk is lower 
than for oil and gas projects, given the lower profi le of 
Arctic m ining. Strict environmenta l regulations can pose 
ma jor operationa l and technica l cha llenges for m ining, 
and tightening of regulation could affect the econom ics 
of some projects. Tax and roya lty regimes, as w ith oil and 
gas projects, are critica l to investment decisions. There 
are considerable risks of environmenta l damage from 
m ining, though these tend to be more easily loca lised 
than the regiona l damage that can be caused by oil and 
gas accidents. However, from a corporate perspective 
m ining risks are no different from environmenta l risks in 
other places. 
Icebergs dwarf a passing boat.
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Norway and Russia, data for other parts of the Arctic are hard 
to come by or, because of under-reporting, highly misleading 60. 
Lack of data compounds the diffi culty of predicting 
the like ly future productivity of Arctic fi sheries. C limate 
change may boost the productivity of aquaculture. The 
20% increase in phytoplankton across the Arctic Ocean 
be tween 1998 and 2009 suggests that the bottom of the 
food cha in in some places may fl ourish. But there are 
a lso concerns. In the longer term , the impacts of climate 
change on particular fi sh stocks could be highly negative 
as those stocks are crowded out by grow ing species (see 
F igure 11). 
Figure 11. Modelled changes in distributions of Arctic cod over the next 30 years
Source: Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) - Arctic Biodiversity Trends 2010: 
Se lected indicators of change 61
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Historica l experience underlines the cha llenge of 
susta inable fi shery management. Greenland’s cod fi shery 
produced be tween 300,000 and 400,000 tons annua lly in 
the 1950s and 1960s. Over the follow ing two decades it 
collapsed, large ly as a result of overfi shing. By 2008 the 
cod fi shery had recovered slightly, but was still less than 
20,000 tons.
A US Senate Joint Resolution from 2008 called on the US 
government to pursue international agreement on a ban on 
commercial fi shing in the Central Arctic Ocean, beyond the 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of any Arctic coastal state 
(see section 2.5). In 2009 the United States government pre-
emptive ly imposed a ban on the expansion of commercial 
shipping in US-controlled waters off A laska. 
2.3 Shipping and l ogistics
Maritime traffi c in the Arctic is a lready considerable. The 
2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment reported 6,000 
vesse ls active in the Arctic 62. Year-round navigation has 
been ma inta ined on the western part of the Russian 
Northern Sea Route (be tween Dudinka and Murmansk) 
since the late 1970s. 
Seasona l conditions vary across the Arctic (see F igure 12). 
However, ice conditions are not necessarily worse in the 
Arctic than e lsewhere. For example, in March 2011 ice 
conditions in the eastern Gulf of F inland outside the Arctic 
required a Russian nuclear icebreaker to be ca lled in from 
the Arctic.
 
Figure 12. Current w inter and summer conditions 
along the Northern Sea Route
Source: London Marke t Joint Hull Comm ittee 2012/004
As shipping seasons extend, Arctic shipping costs are 
reduced and point-to-point demand increases, traffi c is 
expected to increase in future years.
A lready, each Arctic shipping season is marked by a new 
deve lopment. In 2011, the Sovcomfl ot-owned Vladim ir 
Tikhonov became the fi rst supertanker (Suezmax) to sa il 
the Northern Sea Route, w ith a cargo of 120,000 tonnes 
of gas condensate. Later that summer, the largest ever 
bulk carrier crossed the Northern Sea Route when the 
Japanese-owned Sanko Odyssey, carrying 66,000 tonnes 
of iron ore concentrate, comple ted a voyage from the 
Russian Kola Peninsula to Jingtang in China . In the 
summer of 2012, the Korean-built and Norwegian-owned 
Ribera de l Duero Knutsen is expected to become the 
fi rst LNG carrier to transit the Northern Sea Route, from 
Norway to Japan.
Each of these voyages has had to take on expensive 
icebreaker support, w ith ships capable of breaking through 
several metres of ice, despite re lative ly little ice be ing 
encountered in 2010 and 2011. The largest and most 
powerful icebreakers can cost up to $1bn and take 8–10 
years to build 63. Hiring charges vary, but the average 
cost for escort through the Northern Sea route is around 
$200,000 64.
 
However, carrier ships able to trave l through ice of up 
to 1.5 me tres w ithout icebreaker support have been 
deve loped by the company Aker Arctic in F inland. As 
sea ice re treats and thins there is far greater prospect 
of Arctic shipping w ithout icebreaker support for longer 
periods of the year, and ultimate ly a ll year round, in some 
parts of the Arctic. 
This increase in traffi c w ill put additiona l pressure on 
coastguards, search and rescue and hydrographic 
services. In 2012, a single shipping management system 
for the whole length of the Russian Northern Sea Route is 
due to be established. In Canadian Arctic waters, shipping 
is subject to the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 
(AWPPA). The Internationa l Maritime Organisation has 
issued guide lines for ships operating in Arctic areas, 
and these are currently be ing deve loped into what w ill 
become a compulsory Polar Code. Across the Arctic, 
considerable investment is be ing made in hydrographic 
services to improve seabed mapping for shipping – 
previously not a priority – and by nationa l governments 
into improved surve illance and other capabilities.
  Kara Sea Laptev Sea East Siberian Sea
Winter Season Oct-May Oct-June Oct-May/June
Temp typica l -26°C -30°C -21°C
Temp extreme -48°C -50°C -48°C
Ice thickness 1.8-2.5m 1.6-2.5m 1.2-2m
Fog 100 days 75 days 80 days
Summer Season June-Sept July-Sept M id June-Sept
Temp typica l 7°C 8°C 15°C
Temp extreme 20°C 26°C 30°C
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The increase in traffi c will also provide opportunities 
for specialised ship-builders and ship-designers, in the 
Arctic countries themselves and in new centres of ship 
construction in East Asia. Norilsk Nickel has invested heavily 
in ice-capable vessels to ship minerals from Arctic Russia to 
both Europe and China without icebreaker support xxvii. 
Which routes? 
Most shipping journeys are currently re-supplying voyages 
to communities and installations in the Arctic and point-to-
point rather than trans-Arctic. A lthough nuclear icebreakers 
– far more powerful than conventional diese l-e lectric 
icebreakers – make most places in the Arctic technically 
accessible all year round, most Arctic shipping remains 
seasonal, because ice reduces shipping speeds and 
incurs additional fue l costs, and because the cost of using 
icebreakers may make a voyage uneconomic. 
If offshore Arctic oil and gas deve lopment increases, so 
w ill point-to-point maritime traffi c, encouraging additional 
investment in marine infrastructure and ship design. The 
emergence of the Arctic as a large-scale, bulk-carrier 
transport corridor is a longer-term prospect, though the 
fi rst steps towards establishing it have already been taken. 
The basic commercia l logic behind trans-Arctic shipping 
is the shorter geographic distances involved, and the 
expected resulting decrease in days at sea and fue l costs 
(see F igure 13). 
Figure 13. Distances and potential days saved 
for Asian transport from Kirkenes (Norway) and 
Murmansk (Russia)
Source: Tschudi Shipping Company A/S
Distance is important, but it is not the only consideration in 
determining how fast the Northern Sea Route, or other trans-
Arctic shipping routes, will develop. Navigability of particular 
routes in terms of sea-depth, knowledge of the seabed, 
availability of suitable ships and the risks associated with 
xxvii In September 2010 the ice-class diese l-e lectric Norilsk Nicke l-owned Monchegorsk 
sailed from the Siberian port of Dudinka, near Norilsk on the Yenisey river, to Shanghai, 
w ithout ice-breaker support. The ship returned to Dudinka in November, taking just over 7 
days to trave l from Cape Dezhnev on the Bering Strait to Dudinka (2,240 nautical miles).
xxviii Based on an actual voyage performed by M/V Nordic Barents from Kirkenes to 
Lianyungang (China), September 2010.
Nuclear ice breaker heading to the North Pole.
Destination Via Suez Canal Through Northern  Days
 Sea Route                  Saved
 Distance, Speed  Days Distance, Speed Days
  Nm Knots  Nm  Knots  
Shangha i,  12050 14.0 37 6500 12.9  21 -16
China
Busan,  12400 14.0 38 6050 12.9 19.5 -18.5
Korea
Yokohama ,  12730 14.0 39 5750 12.9 18.5 -20.5
Japan
xxviii
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Arctic shipping are all factors (see section 3). The existence 
and location of trans-shipment ports – to allow transfer 
between Arctic and non-Arctic vessels – may shape Arctic 
maritime logistics in the future.
The cost competitiveness of Arctic routes re lative to more 
southern routes may be constrained by:
 
•  The time taken to issue permits and the cost of these 
permits re lative to other passages.
•  The re lative ly slow speed of ice-breaking transport 
vesse ls (where still required).
•  The challenge of full utilisation of tonnage capacity in 
both directions xxix.
• The cost of insurance.
•  The need to prepare vesse ls for Arctic conditions 
through w interisation processes (such as installing ice 
navigation radar systems, heating arrangements for 
pipes, on-board ice removal equipment and ensuring 
the ship’s bridge is fully enclosed 65). 
•  The infrastructure, surve illance and management of 
Arctic sea-lanes.
 
A comparison of two often-cited Arctic shipping routes – 
the Northwest Passage through Canada’s Arctic and the 
Northern Sea Route across the northern coast of Russia 
– suggests that the Northern Sea Route is more likely to be 
subject to large-scale development over the next 10–20 
years because of political support, projected ice conditions 
(see Figure 13) and the development of onshore and 
offshore mineral resources in the Russian Arctic 66.
The Northern Sea Route may ultimate ly become a major 
global energy corridor between Russia and East Asia. 
While trans-Arctic shipping volumes along the Northern 
Sea Route are insignifi cant compared w ith overall global 
shipping volumes, total cargo has increased by a factor 
of ten in recent years (though from a historically low leve l 
follow ing the collapse of the Soviet Union) 67.
Looking to the future, by the middle of the coming 
century, Arctic conditions may have changed so much 
that a shipping route across the North Pole, bypassing the 
Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage, becomes 
commercially viable (see Figure 14). 
2.4 A rctic Tou r ism
Tourism has a long history in re lative ly we ll-deve loped 
parts of the Arctic, such as coastal Norway. Improved 
accessibility has increasingly allowed tourism to deve lop in 
less populated and economically deve loped areas, creating 
a substantial seasonal economy. The number of nights 
spent at hote ls in Greenland increased from 179,349 in 
2002 to 236,913 in 2008 69. In Longyearbyen, on Svalbard, 
these numbers rose from around 30,000 in 1995 to over 
89,000 in 2008 (before declining to 77,000 in 2010) xxx. Arctic 
tourism has not only become more common, it has also 
become far more global, w ith greatly increased numbers of 
tourists from outside the home country. 
The cruise sector, less constrained by limits on onshore 
tourist accommodation and more diffi cult to regulate 
because it operates in offshore areas, has also expanded 
substantially. In 2003, an Association of Arctic Expedition 
Cruise Operators (AECO) was set up to support and establish 
best practice for cruises, particularly in the Norwegian Arctic. 
Of fi fteen AECO vesse ls off the coast of eastern Svalbard in 
2011, fi ve were Russian-registered, three Dutch, two from 
Nassau Bahamas, two registered in the Bahamas, and one 
each French, Panamanian and Swedish 70. 
Many of the challenges associated w ith cruise ship tourism 
in the Arctic are similar to those affecting commercial 
shipping: re lative ly poor know ledge of seabed features, lack 
of infrastructure in terms of port facilities, and the need for xxix Ships used in the Arctic may be useful for one-way voyages where a cargo is to be 
carrried from A to B, but in order for such voyages to be commercially viable, the ship 
must be able to return to the point of departure, preferably w ith a cargo to defray the 
costs of the return journey. Economic viability is therefore enhanced by two-way traffi c. xxx The fi nal fi gures for 2011 are expected to show an increase in the previous year. 
Figure 14. Maritime accessibility in 2000-2014 and 2045-2059 (Type A vessels, July-September)66 
Route Length (km) % accessible, 2000-2014 % accessible, 2045-2059 Accessibility change (%) relative to baseline Transit time (days), 2045-2059 
Northwest Passage 9,324 63% 82% +30% - 
Northern Sea Route 5,169 86% 100% +16% 11
‘North Pole’ Route 6,960 64% 100% + 56% 16
‘Arctic Bridge’   7,135 100% 100% + 0% 15
Source: Reprinted by permission from Macmillan Publishers Ltd (Nature Climate Change) ‘Divergent long-term trajectories of human access to the Arctic’, Copyright 2011 68
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w interisation of vesse ls and the removal of deck-icing. 
In 2010 the MV Clipper Adventurer cruise ship ran aground 
in the Canadian Arctic on a rock initially claimed to be 
“uncharted”. The Canadian Coast Guard took two days to reach 
the vesse l. There has been subsequent legal disagreement 
over potential compensation. While the Arctic Council 
reached a pan-Arctic Search and Rescue (SAR) Agreement 
in May 2011, providing a fi rm basis for co-operation 
between Arctic states, search and rescue infrastructure 
and capability remain constrained (see section 3.1). 
2.5 A rctic Po l itics
The Arctic is, in general terms, a stable region w ith 
considerable mutual trust between states. The Arctic 
Council – comprising the e ight Arctic states, permanent 
participants and observers – represents the key role of 
dialogue in Arctic governance politics xxxi. Neverthe less, 
there is naturally a range of potential stress points w ithin 
and between the e ight Arctic states, and between these 
states and non-Arctic states. A number of potential shifts 
are in sight w ithin Arctic geopolitics – from the possible 
independence of Greenland, to the increasing involvement 
of non-Arctic states such as China in Arctic politics, and 
the risks of misunderstanding arising from a build-up of 
Arctic states’ military hardware. However, while any of 
these factors could affect Arctic politics, and all need to be 
managed, none of them are like ly to fundamentally change 
the co-operative nature of Arctic politics and governance. 
The key question, therefore, is the extent of co-operation 
rather than the possibility of outright confl ict. 
2.5.1 Who owns what? Who controls what? 
Ownership of the Arctic is principally determined by 
ownership of land in the Arctic, by scientifi c data, by the 
international law of the sea and by the domestic law of 
Arctic states 71.
Most parts of the land of the Arctic are beyond dispute 
– Hans Island is the only area of minor dispute between 
Canada and Denmark.
All Arctic states, except the United States, have ratifi ed 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which 
establishes the global framework of rules for rights and 
responsibilities on the world’s oceans, including determining 
how far states can claim sovereign rights over resource-rich 
areas xxxii. In May 2008 fi ve coastal states – Canada, Denmark 
(Greenland), Norway, Russia and the United States – 
re-committed themselves to the framework of the law of the 
sea and to the orderly settlement of overlapping claims xxxiii.
Under the law of the sea, all states exercise an exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) 200 nautical miles (370 kilometres) 
from the ir coastline, giving them economic rights over 
the water and seabed resources up to that point. Most 
potential offshore oil and gas deve lopments are we ll 
w ithin this limit. A lthough land borders are not disputed, 
adjacent states may disagree over the ir maritime borders. 
Canada and the US disagree over the ir maritime border 
in a potentially hydrocarbon-rich area of the Beaufort 
Sea. Norway and Russia agreed a new maritime border in 
the eastern Barents Sea in 2010 after 40 years of dispute, 
opening the way to oil and gas exploration. 
Beyond the EEZ, in the Arctic as e lsewhere, states may 
have ownership over the econom ic resources of the 
seabed – the extended continenta l she lf – up to 350 
nautica l m iles (650 kilome tres). Beyond these areas 
of the seabed, other provisions of the law of the sea 
de term ine the conditions under which resources could be 
deve loped, were they to be discovered 72.
Establishing ownership over the extended continenta l 
she lf depends on a range of geologica l and 
geomorphologica l factors, often requiring expensive 
and large-sca le data collection. The Comm ission on 
the Lim its of the Continenta l She lf (CLCS) provides 
recommendations to states which provide subm issions to 
A cruise liner nears a glacier.
xxxii The United States views UNCLOS as representing international customary law. 
xxxiii Ice land and the non-coastal states (Sweden and Finland) were not present, leading to 
suggestions that the Arctic Council was be ing circumvented in favour of a new grouping: 
the A-5xxxi Other Arctic forums include the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Nordic Council. 
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xxxiv The deve lopment of domestic energy supply is a major political issue in the United 
States, and was a motivating force behind the permitting of the Trans-A laska Pipe line in 
the 1970s. Support for drilling in offshore A laska – and in sensitive onshore areas such as 
the Arctic National Wildlife Reserve (ANWR) – is greater in A laska for a number of reasons; 
jobs associated w ith the oil and gas industry, state revenues, and because all residents 
rece ive an annual dividend payment from the A laska Permanent Fund, in to which a 
share of oil revenues have historically been diverted. 
the CLCS. Some states have co-operated bilatera lly in data 
collection for UNCLOS subm issions, both to share the cost 
of research and to increase mutua l trust. It is possible for 
states to make joint subm issions.
States have ten years to make submissions to the CLCS 
from ratifi cation of UNCLOS. Russia provided a submission in 
2001 and was told to supply more data to establish its case. 
This is expected to happen in 2012. Norway submitted data 
in 2006 and received recommendations in 2009. Canada 
and Denmark have until 2013 and 2014 respectively to 
make submissions. The United States is not able to make a 
submission, but maintains that UNCLOS recognises rights 
rather than establishes them, and is active in collecting data. 
There is potential for other states to challenge Arctic states’ 
submissions and for the areas they cover to overlap at the ir 
outer edges. If this happens, states w ill have to negotiate 
between themse lves, w ith the CLCS potentially playing an 
advisory – but not binding – role. While it is conce ivable that 
a state might fail to agree w ith a CLCS recommendation, 
the political costs of doing so would be high in terms of 
breaking w ith the prevailing legal arrangements of the 
Arctic. Either way, the CLCS has a considerable backlog of 
submissions, meaning that full legal clarity in the near term 
may require co-operative submissions.
There are some other areas of disagreement. Norway 
asserts that the Svalbard Treaty does not apply to 
Svalbard’s potentially mineral-rich continental she lf. Others 
disagree. Norway has invited them to seek a ruling of the 
International Court of Justice. Russia and Norway have long 
disputed fi shing rights around Svalbard. An offi cial Russian 
government strategy on the Russian presence on Svalbard 
up to 2020 is expected shortly. 
Canada’s position on the legal status of the North West 
Passage – that it comprises internal Canadian waters – 
is disputed by the United States and others. The United 
Kingdom views the Northwest Passage and the Russian 
Northern Sea Route as international waters. The legal rights 
of coastal states to regulate shipping in ice-covered waters 
under UNCLOS may be challenged because of climate 
change, as specifi c UNCLOS provisions applying to ice-
covered waters may be considered no longer applicable. 
But sovere ignty and ownership are only one aspect 
of legal issues in the Arctic. Equally salient may be the 
establishment of international regulations and guide lines, 
such as through the International Maritime Organisation. 
In most parts of the Arctic – and particularly onshore – it is 
domestic regulation and domestic legal challenges rather 
than uncertainties over the international legal position that 
are like ly to affect economic deve lopment and investment.
2.5.2 The geopolitics of Arctic energy
Arctic oil and gas resources are highly politicised. Within 
most Arctic countries, oil and gas deve lopment is politically 
controversial on environmental grounds and can have a 
signifi cant infl uence on the political dynamics between 
central and local governments. Over time, the integration of 
the Arctic economy into the global economy – principally 
through energy and transport – w ill further increase its 
geopolitical re levance.
In the US, the opening of further areas of the US Arctic to 
exploration and, ultimately, development has strong support 
within Alaska, but limited support elsewhere xxxiv. In Canada, 
Arctic energy and mining projects play into complex federal 
politics and the domestic politics of indigenous peoples 
across the north. In Greenland, exploration for offshore 
hydrocarbons is widely accepted as a pathway to greater 
economic prosperity and a guarantee of self-government. 
In Russia, maintaining oil production and increasing 
production of natural gas is a strategic imperative. In 
Norway, government and public support for development is 
contingent on strong environmental regulation. 
There is a key geopolitical dimension to Arctic oil and 
gas developments, involving states’ power, stability 
and infl uence. This is particularly true of Russia, where 
hydrocarbons represent 40% of export earnings and 
the state budget depends on taxes and royalties from 
hydrocarbon production. Russia’s gas exports are a major 
feature of its geopolitical role in Europe, while expanding 
oil and gas exports to China has become an important 
policy objective for the Russian government. Nonetheless, 
development of the Russian oil and gas sector in the 
Arctic – particularly offshore – depends to some extent 
on the participation of Western oil and gas fi rms with the 
technology and management skills to develop them. 
The development of Norwegian gas production, and the 
potential for export via existing pipeline networks to which 
the United Kingdom is connected, may reduce European 
dependence on other sources of gas. In November 2011 
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British company Centrica signed a 10-year, £13bn ($20bn) 
supply deal for natural gas from Norway, following a wider 
UK–Norway Memorandum of Understanding on energy 73.
Increased oil and gas production in Arctic North America 
is often presented as a way of improving US ‘energy 
security’, though export prospects to Asia may ultimate ly 
trump home markets. Investments across the Arctic are 
increasingly international – w ith interest from Indian, 
Chinese and South Korean companies. 
2.5.3 Arctic governance
Arctic governance is multi-layered. Responsibility for 
governing the Arctic lies principally with the eight sovereign 
Arctic states operating through their domestic administrative 
and legal systems and, where they chose to, through 
bilateral arrangements and international treaties, such as 
the 2011 Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement. All the Arctic 
states, however, have other affi liations and roles within the 
international system – in NATO, the European Union or the 
UN Security Council – which affect their perspectives on 
Arctic governance and their ability to shape it. 
International agreements – for example on biodiversity, or 
on certain pollutants – also apply to the Arctic. There are a 
number of other governance bodies involved in creating 
rules and regulations for Arctic activity, the most prominent 
of which is the International Maritime Organisation. 
However, the essential organisation in Arctic governance 
frameworks is the Arctic Council, a forum for coordination 
and co-operation between the Arctic states on a range 
of issues, excluding security, but including environmental 
monitoring and the creation of common standards for 
shipping and oil and gas deve lopment. The e ight Arctic 
states are all equal members of the Arctic Council. The 
Council also includes a number of non-voting permanent 
participants. Most of these are indigenous groups and 
some are highly infl uential in the domestic politics of Arctic 
states. There are also a number of permanent observers, 
including France, Germany and the United Kingdom. 
In 2008, it appeared that a separate caucus group was 
emerging w ithin the Arctic Council, comprising the fi ve 
Arctic coastal states – Canada, Denmark (Greenland), 
Norway, Russia and the United States or collective ly the A-5 
– but excluding Ice land and the non-coastal states xxxv.
Perhaps more signifi cantly in the long term, the Arctic 
Council is currently discussing the application of criteria 
for the status of permanent observers. These criteria were 
established in 2011 follow ing disagreements between 
Arctic states as to how to approach applications from non-
Arctic states – including the European Union and China 
– for permanent observer status. A fi nal decision on these 
states should be taken in spring 2013.
 
Figure 15. The Arctic politics matrix 
Source: Chatham House
 UNCLOS signatory? Arctic continental shelf claim? Arctic Council?  A-5 Permanent Member of the EU NATO Dedicated polar 
  (Year ratified) (Year submitted to CLCS) United Nations Security Council  research?
Canada 2003  (Expected 2012/2013)    
Denmark (Greenland) 2004 (Expected 2013/2014)  Greenland 
   is not part of 
   the EU
F inland 1996      
Ice land 1985 2009 (under consideration) EU candidate 
Norway  1994 2006 (adopted 2009)  EEA state
Russia  1997 2001 (revised subm ission
  expected 2012)    
Sw eden 2003       
United States Not ratified Data collection; but no 
  time line for subm ission   
China 1995     
France 1996  Permanent observer    
Germany 1994  Permanent observer    
India 1995     
Japan 1996     
South Korea  1996     
United Kingdom  1997  Permanent observer  
xxxv This exclusion provoked some concern amongst other Arctic Council member states. 
In 2010, the United States, itse lf a member of the A-5, publicly criticised the A-5 format at 
a second meeting he ld in Canada. Nonethe less, the possibility of future A-5 meetings has 
been left open by several Arctic states. 
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The Arctic is a complex risk 
environment. Many of the 
operational risks to Arctic economic 
deve lopment – particularly oil and gas 
deve lopments and shipping – amplify 
one another: remoteness, cold and, in 
w inter, darkness. 
At the same time, the resilience of the Arctic’s ecosystems 
in terms of w ithstanding risk events is weak, and political 
sensitivity to a disaster is high. Worst-case scenarios may 
be worse in the Arctic because the ability to manage 
evolving situations is limited by environmental conditions 
and the lack of appropriate infrastructure. 
Though risks can, and should, be mitigated through prudent 
corporate risk management, public interest and prevailing 
regulatory frameworks, they cannot be e liminated entire ly. 
The potential commercial opportunities – to discover and 
extract substantial quantities of oil and gas or to reduce 
shipping costs – may encourage some companies to 
take on greater business, operational and political risks. 
However, it is for governments to decide what is an 
acceptable leve l of environmental risk, and to establish 
the ir preferred policy outcomes. Perce ived risks and 
political tolerance to risk may change, as happened in the 
United States after the Macondo blowout, and these may 
be at odds w ith companies’ assessment of risks. 
This report has already identifi ed a number of key 
uncertainties around the future economic and political 
trajectory of the Arctic, including the scale of hydrocarbon 
resources, the future location and predictability of sea ice, 
and the w ider consequences of climate change. These 
uncertainties are the greatest risks to potential investors 
in Arctic economic deve lopment. The extended lead-times 
in Arctic projects, which often re late to a matrix of other 
risks and infrastructure gaps, can change the overall 
economic situation by the time any investment becomes 
productive. While this is a familiar business risk that may 
be balanced by economic opportunity, it underlines the 
need for improved know ledge, risk assessment and risk 
management in the Arctic context. 
3. Assessing and managing A rctic r isks
Though risks can, and should, be mitigated through 
prudent corporate risk management, public 
interest and prevailing regulatory frameworks, they 
cannot be e liminated entire ly. 
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3.1 Ope r ationa l  r isk facto rs
Even under conditions of climate change, the Arctic 
remains a frontier operating environment. Many operational 
risks w ill continue to be an issue for parts of the Arctic 
year even under a warming climate. Other factors may be 
worsened or complicated by climate change.
Geographic remoteness
Many parts of the Arctic are geographically isolated, 
bringing operational challenges, entailing substantial costs 
and amplifying the potential consequences of risk events. 
The infrastructure and capability to manage accidents 
may be distant or unava ilable. In November 2010, the Pew 
Environmenta l Trust re leased a report questioning the 
capability of current infrastructure and technology to dea l 
w ith a spill in some Arctic areas, arguing that until there is 
be tter research on marine ecosystems and the e ffects of 
an oil spill on them , these areas should rema in off-lim its 
to deve lopment 74.
Positive ly, the pan-Arctic Search and Rescue (SAR) 
Agreement signed in May 2011 committed Arctic states to 
provide resources to SAR w ithin defi ned geographic zones 
– in areas beyond the ir own jurisdiction – where they can. 
But the ability to adequate ly cover these areas, particularly 
if there is increased activity, is still uncertain. Information 
about SAR services and the ir availability differs from 
country to country. 
A study of the operating conditions of Norway’s SAR 
he licopter missions in the Arctic showed that the nearest 
base for the Norwegian Barents is in Banak Military A irfi e ld, 
Lakse lv at 70°N, in Finnmark xxxvi. Since the sinking of the 
Kolskaya oil rig in December 2011, Russia’s preparedness 
for emergencies has been questioned. Particular concern 
exists over the offshore Prirazlomnoye platform, some 
1,000 kilometres from the nearest sizeable port at 
Murmansk, which is designed to store up to 840,000 barre ls 
of oil xxxvii. Environmental groups and others in the United 
States and Canada have long expressed concerns about 
search and rescue and clean-up capacity in Arctic areas 75.
 
In some cases this w ill involve substantia l additiona l costs 
if private companies are to operate safe ly and responsibly 
in the Arctic: Gazprom has stated its w illingness to pay 
a lmost $550m for a sea-based he licopter platform at the 
Barents Sea 76.
Greenland w ilderness from the air. xxvi This base has one he licopter w ith medical staff on board, which has been able to 
deal w ith most serious injuries. Besides this, there are some Norwegian Coast Guard 
ships w ith SAR-equipped he licopters on board. For more information about the statistics 
and effectiveness of Norwegian SAR missions in the Artic see Haagensen, R.; Sjøborg, 
K.A .; Rossing, A .; Ingil æ , H.; Markengbakken, L. and Steen, P (2004) ‘Long Range Rescue 
He licopter Missions in the Arctic’, Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, Vol. 19, No. 2.
xxvii Nataliya Vasilyeva, ‘Kolskaya Oil Rig Sinking Sparks Doubt Over Arctic Plan’, Huffi ngton 
Post, 23 December 2011.
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xxviii Dufour, Bastien (2009) ‘Polar Communications & Weather (PWC) Mission Overview ’, 
Canadian Space Agency, presentation available at www.envirosecurity.org/arctic/
Presentations/EAC_Dufour.pdf 
Electronic communications challenges
Magnetic and solar phenomena, interference and 
geostationary sate llite geometry all mean that high-
frequency radio and GPS are degraded above 70°-72° 
North, a major issue for communications, navigation, and 
search and rescue. Limitations and expense of high rate 
sate llite communications may be partially resolved over 
the next few years w ith the launch of a number of Arctic- 
specifi c sate llite communications systems by the European 
and Canadian space agencies xxxviii. The Iridium conste llation 
of communications sate llites provides communication 
services that operate in the Arctic environment, albe it w ith 
limited bandw idth.
Climate change-related factors
Access to some parts of the Arctic is expected to improve, 
particularly in coastal areas, and principally as a result of 
changing maritime conditions. In other parts of the Arctic, 
however, accessibility may decline, as me lting permafrost 
(soil at or be low the freezing point of water) damages fi xed 
infrastructure and as shorter w inter road seasons reduce 
accessibility by land (see section 1.4). Me lting permafrost 
may present additional challenges for onshore oil and gas 
drilling by raising the risk of drill-rig instability (see box 4). 
Weather 
Weather can change quickly in the Arctic, weather stations 
are re lative ly sparse, and weather forecasts are generally 
more uncertain ow ing to sate llite constraints. In some 
places, the range of temperatures from w inter to summer, 
and even the range of temperatures w ithin a single day, 
means that designs have to be adapted and special 
materials used for Arctic construction, such as stee l that 
is less brittle. The length of w inter Arctic nights remains a 
challenge for operations. Low temperatures, in the Arctic 
as e lsewhere, can cause machinery to se ize up and, in high 
w inds, make w ind-chill extreme ly dangerous for workers. 
Companies must also adhere to more stringent health 
and safety procedures such as limitations on outside work 
in low temperatures. A ll of these have implications for 
operating procedures, and costs 77.
The Trans-A laska Pipe line system, in almost continuous 
operation since 1977, was temporarily shut down in 
January 2012 as a result of weather conditions reported as 
“not uncommon” 78. The closure caused an estimated daily 
loss of $18.1m to the A laskan government in taxes and 
royalties from the sale of oil 79.
Icing and icebergs
Icing is a serious hazard for Arctic shipping, causing 
machinery to se ize up and making vesse ls more top-
heavy. It is also a major problem for coastal infrastructure, 
particularly in places exposed to sea-spray and storms. 
Statoil’s Me lkøya LNG plant, just outside Hammerfest in 
Norway, the only such plant above the Arctic Circle, has 
reported a number of technical diffi culties, some of which 
re late to location, temperature and icing 80. At the time, 
Norwegian media speculated that the problem cost Statoil 
$34–$51m a week in lost revenue 81.
Conditions vary around the Arctic and most of these 
challenges are ne ither new nor particular to the areas 
above 60º North that are the primary focus of this report. As 
already noted, sea ice conditions around Sakhalin and the 
Sea of Okhotsk – in Russia’s Far East and far south of the 
Arctic Circle – are far worse than those off the north coast 
of Norway. Iceberg management systems are in use off 
the coast of sub-Arctic Newfoundland, Canada, identifying 
icebergs far from vulnerable installations, defl ecting 
icebergs w ith tugs if possible and allow ing suffi cient time 
for installations to move off if defl ection is not possible 82.
Many of these cha llenges can be managed – though 
at additiona l cost – through the application of existing 
technologies, through specifi c design and build 
specifi cations, or w ith adapted processes and additiona l 
infrastructure. However, the combination of factors 
means that the Arctic w ill rema in a frontier operating 
environment, w ith or w ithout climate change. The 
m itigation of these operationa l risks implies not only 
corporate investment but a lso government participation 
and support, in order to ma inta in and ensure adequate 
leve ls of surve illance and management. 
Ce llular phone station.
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3.2 Risks to the envi r onment
The Arctic environment is, in general, highly sensitive 
to damage. Re lative ly simple ecosystem structures and 
short grow ing seasons limit the resilience of the natural 
environment, and make environmental recovery harder 
to achieve. Damage to the Arctic environment, if it occurs, 
is like ly to have long-term impacts. However, the Arctic is 
not one ecosystem, but comprises a variety of ecosystems 
and environmental conditions. The vulnerability of each 
ecosystem depends on a range of factors, including 
its complexity and structure. In all cases, base line 
know ledge about the natural environment and consistent 
environmental monitoring is a prerequisite for measuring 
and understanding environmental impacts.
Pollution from outside the Arctic
The Arctic has long been exposed to the effects of pollution 
from outside the region. Black carbon – essentially small 
dark particles of soot from the burning of fossil fue ls – has 
been associated w ith processes of rapid Arctic warming 
through its additional absorption of solar radiation 83. 
Industrial pollutants are transferred to the Arctic by both 
air and sea. Approximate ly 100 tonnes of airborne mercury 
derived from industrial pollution are deposited in the Arctic 
Ocean annually. A process of bio-accumulation in Arctic 
fauna – essentially the aggregation of pollutants at higher 
leve ls of the food chain – has led to concentrations of some 
heavy metals and POPs that are far higher than outside the 
Arctic 84. Ultimate ly this has an impact on human health, 
often the last link in the Arctic food chain xxxix.
While the path pollution takes and the processes that 
cause it to accumulate in fauna cannot easily be stopped, 
cutting global emissions would have a direct impact on 
concentrations of pollutants in the Arctic. However, under a 
‘status quo’ scenario mercury emissions worldw ide would 
increase by 25% in 2020 over 2005 leve ls. As emission 
sources for some pollutants move closer to the Arctic, 
they w ill inevitably have an impact on the local and w ider 
natural environment.
Climate change, by me lting ice in which pollutants may 
currently be locked, may directly worsen concentrations of 
pollutants in Arctic ecosystems 85.
Ecosystem disturbance
As in the past, it is highly like ly that future economic 
activity in the Arctic w ill further disturb ecosystems already 
stressed by the consequences of climate change. Migration 
patterns of caribou and whales in offshore areas may be 
affected. Other than the direct re lease of pollutants into 
the Arctic environment, there are multiple ways in which 
ecosystems could be disturbed: 
•  Through the construction of pipe lines and roads xl.
•  Through noise pollution from offshore drilling, se ismic 
survey activity or additional maritime traffi c. 
•  Through physical disturbance of the sea and seabed 
during drilling. 
• Through the break-up of sea ice. 
Under national legislation in most Arctic countries a 
number of these factors must be included when making an 
environmental impact assessment of any deve lopmentxli, 
though the combined impact of deve lopments w ill be far 
greater than those of any single project. But know ledge 
gaps are signifi cant 86. In combination w ith climate change, 
increased shipping in the Arctic is like ly to increase the 
prevalence of invasive species, w ith major impacts on 
some Arctic ecosystems. 
xxxix A laskan Community Action on Toxics, Persistent Organic Pollutants in the Arctic 
http:/ /www.ipen.org/ ipenweb/documents/pop%20documents/cop4_pops_arctic.pdf
xl The construction of the Trans-A laska Pipe line, in particular, prompted a large number 
of environmental studies on the impact of the pipe line on migration routes. The design 
was altered to enable migration and the impact of the pipe line on migration has been 
substantially reduced as a result. 
xli For an examples see the Arctic Environmental Impact Assessment http:/ /arcticcentre.
ulapland.fi /aria/ 
The Trans-A laskan Pipe line.
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Pollution w ithin the Arctic 
There is a range of potential pollution sources w ithin the 
Arctic, including mines, oil and gas installations, current 
industrial sites and, in the Russian Arctic, nuclear waste 
from both civilian and military nuclear installations, and 
from nuclear weapons testing on Novaya Zemlya. However, 
the risk of an oil spill, w ith multiple implications for the 
way in which oil and gas companies drill and operate in 
the Arctic, is probably the most re levant. It represents the 
greatest risk in terms of environmental damage, potential 
cost and insurance.
As discussed, many of the techniques for managing Arctic 
conditions, including ice, are ne ither new nor specifi c to 
the area north of 60°. Dynamic positioning drill ships or 
ice-resistant rigs and man-made islands have been used 
for some time, including in offshore A laska in the 1980s and 
off Sakhalin. Location in the Arctic is only one risk factor 
for oil and gas deve lopment. The technical challenges of 
production in onshore or shallow-water offshore areas – 
and the associated risks of an oil spill – are no greater, and 
possibly far smaller, than in deep offshore areas anywhere 
e lse in the world. (In more remote and deeper parts of the 
Arctic the challenges are multiplied.) 
However, cleaning up any oil spill in the Arctic, particularly 
in ice-covered areas, would present multiple obstacles 
which together constitute a unique and hard-to-manage 
risk (see F igure 16). There are signifi cant know ledge 
gaps in this area . Rates of natura l biodegradation of oil 
in the Arctic could be expected to be lower than in more 
temperate environments such as the Gulf of Mexico, 
a lthough there is currently insuffi cient understanding 
of how oil w ill degrade over the long term in the Arctic. 
The presence of sea ice could assist in some oil-spill 
response techniques such as in situ burning and chemica l 
dispersant application. However, the techniques for 
keeping oil in one place have the ir own environmenta l 
impacts, notably a ir pollution and the re lease of chemica ls 
into the marine environment w ithout know ing where 
moving ice w ill eventua lly carry them 87.
3.3 Whose l iabi l ity? Which l iabi l ity regime?
The question of an appropriate liability regime for oil 
companies operating in the Arctic is contested amongst 
local populations, environmental campaigners, oil 
companies and central and federal governments.
Several international regimes govern liability for marine 
pollution caused by shipping xlii. There are we ll-established 
norms that provide for prompt compensation payments 
to victims for damage suffered in the territory of a state 
that is bound by the re levant treaties. Civil liabilities for 
shipowners are limited under these regimes to around 
 Favourable conditions for response technique
 Conditions like ly to impede particular response technique
 Conditions which w ill render particular response technique impossible
Note that any single grey factor could shut down a response . Similarly, a combination of ye llow factors may have an aggregate impact on response .
* Moderate visibility = light fog < 1 mile visibility; low visibility = heavy fog <1/4 mile visibility, or darkness. 
Ice coverage Wind Wave height VisibilityLimiting factor
Conditions <10% >70% Solid ice <3 ft 3-6 ft >6 ft High Moderate* Low*
0-20
mph
21-35
mph
>35
mph
11%
to
30%
31%
to
70%
Mechanical recovery
with no
ice management
Mechanical recovery
with ice management
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In-situ burning
Figure 16. Different oil spill response techniques under a range of Arctic conditions
Source: Nuka Research and Planning Group, LLC and Pearson Consulting, LLC, 2010, Oil 
spill prevention and response in the U.S. Arctic Ocean – unexamined risks, unacceptable 
consequences, Report to the Pew Environment Group.
xlii These are: The 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
(CLC) and the 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of an International 
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (Fund Convention); International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage 2008.
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$139mxliii, but an international fund accumulated from levies 
on oil cargo interests xliv can supplement compensation to 
a maximum of around $315m 88. Environmental liability for 
shipowners is limited to economic losses caused by the 
pollution and the re instatement of clean-up costs and only 
extends to damage in coastal state maritime zones. 
These conventions have been evolving since 1969 and the 
trend is towards increasing liabilities and the scope for 
claims. For example, a further convention from the IMO on 
hazardous and noxious substances, not yet in force, covers 
risks to life and property beyond pollution and increases 
the coverage beyond oil to, for example, other liquids and 
solid materials possessing chemical hazards 89. When this 
convention is enacted, shipowners from contracting party 
states w ill be liable to a maximum limit of 115 million 
Special Draw ing Rights (SDR), currently $178 million xlv.
At the time of writing, there is as yet no international 
instrument on liability and compensation resulting from 
spills from offshore oil rigs, pipe lines and sub-sea we llhead 
production systems 90. An EU proposal currently under 
discussion would apply to offshore oil projects in the 
Arctic territories of Norway and Denmark and possibly to 
all EU companies, wherever the ir operations. This would 
increase the companies’ compliance requirements for 
both equipment standards and fi nancial guarantees. An 
Arctic Council Task Force is developing recommendations 
on an international instrument on Arctic marine oil pollution, 
preparedness and response, due for release in 2013. This 
aims at developing a more streamlined process to ensure 
more rapid clean-up and compensation payments. Given 
the potential trans-national impact of spills, this may include 
an international liability and compensation instrument. 
Greenland, for example, has argued that “different national 
systems may lead to ambiguities and unnecessary delays in 
oil pollution responses and compensation payments” and 
that any regime must adapt as understanding of the ‘worst-
case scenario’ in the Arctic changes 91.
The appendix illustrates the variety of national 
environmental regulations covering Arctic offshore 
operations. The inadequacies of both company and 
government capacities to act in the event of a disaster 
were demonstrated follow ing the Macondo blowout in 
the Gulf of Mexico in April 2011. The Arctic’s vulnerable 
environment, unpredictable climate and lack of any 
precedent on which to base cost assessment have 
led some environmenta l NGOs to argue that no 
compensation would be worth the risk of a llow ing 
drilling to take place in pristine offshore areas. Others 
are campa igning for more stringent regulations and the 
remova l of liability caps for investors. 
At the licensing stage, governments need to assure 
themse lves of the capability of companies to prevent a 
blowout and, in the event that it occurs, the capacity to 
stop it quickly, contain it and clean up any oil leakage. 
xliii International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage in 1992, based on the value of Special Draw ing 
Rights (SDR) at 27 February 2012.
xliv Levies are calculated on the basis of the shipping company’s national share of 
international oil rece ipts.
xlv SDRs are an international accounting unit. 
The Exxon Valdez, disabled in Prince William Sound in 1989.
41Arctic Opening: Opportunity and Risk in the High North
Arctic conditions could present diffi culties in reaching 
the site of a blowout and containing a spill. The Canadian 
National Energy Bureau’s ongoing Review of Offshore 
Drilling in the Canadian Arctic (RODAC), for example, takes 
into account infrastructure gaps (eg coastguard facilities, 
dedicated emergency he licopters, booms, absorbents and 
skimmers) that would hinder the rapid distribution of oil-
spill response equipment to the Beaufort Sea 92. Companies 
drilling in offshore Canada must already have we ll-control 
technology installed and maintain the capacity to drill a 
same-season re lief we ll (to mitigate the consequences of 
a blowout), despite the high costs this would impose on 
producers, potentially driving investors away 93. New fi ling 
regulations re leased as part of the RODAC allow companies 
to waive this condition if they can prove the same 
containment impact by other methods. The Pew report 
cited above recommended that the US Government should 
require oil companies to demonstrate the ir containment 
capacity in test drills 94.
Whe ther the liability for damage to human hea lth and 
econom ic losses should be lim ited or unlim ited is an 
ongoing debate in Canada and the US. Genera l ‘unlim ited 
liability’ is often thought to create a risk too great for 
investors, a lthough some may accept it for specifi c 
aspects such as the loss of current and future fi shing 
harvest revenues 95. Apart from the damage to loca l 
econom ies, ecosystem damage and degradation are 
notoriously diffi cult to put a va lue on and are not currently 
accounted for under nationa l regimes. Some upper 
liability lim its apply to companies operating facilities in 
offshore A laska and Canada ’s eastern Arctic. The US O il 
Pollution Act specifi es a lim it of US$75m for econom ic 
damages xlvi, and the Canada O il and Gas Operations Act of 
1985 specifi es CAN$40m for loss or damage, remediation 
and restoration xlvii. However, ne ither applies in cases of 
fault or gross negligence, where liabilities are unlim ited. 
Norway, Greenland and Russia do not se t upper lim its for 
companies (see Appendix for more de ta ils). 
Even though much greater claims can be pursued through 
the courts where fault can be established, some NGOs 
are arguing that the liabilities cap and extent of fi nancial 
responsibility a company must demonstrate to w in a lease 
put the public purse under enormous risk 96. In allow ing 
investors w ithout suffi cient funds to pay for the clean-up 
and reparations for a large-scale environmental disaster, 
the cap is essentially a transfer of risk to the public 
sector to encourage investment. In the US a company 
must demonstrate fi nancial capability of up to US$150m. 
This is a fraction of the estimated US$40bn clean-up and 
compensation costs for the Macondo disaster. A smaller 
company than BP, for example, might have had to declare 
bankruptcy, leaving the state to foot the bill.
F inancia l capacity is an evolving area . The requirements 
are especia lly stringent in Greenland. In its 2010 Baffi n 
Bay licensing round, the government, recognising the 
population’s re liance on the loca l ecosystem for its 
live lihood, specifi ed that companies must have at least 
$10bn of equity to qua lify and that sma ller companies 
w inning exploration acreage would have to provide a 
$2bn bond to cover the clean-up costs of a spill. This 
would e ither involve a parent-company guarantee for the 
larger companies or be a stra ight advance at the time of 
the award 97.
In most cases, several companies w ill be involved – the 
concessionaires and the service companies – w ith various 
fi nancial capacities and insurances. An effi cient liability 
regime w ill he lp allow rapid identifi cation of the responsible 
party and collection of compensation. In Norway, for 
example, the law clearly states that the licensee of a block 
is responsible for any pollution caused by operations there, 
regardless of fault. If a service company were at fault, the 
licensee would still be liable for all damages. They would 
have to pay out and then fi le a suit against the service 
company to recover its costs. This is in marked contrast 
to the US, which apportions responsibility to the entity 
owning the vesse l or infrastructure from which pollutant 
was discharged. Companies w ill need to be aware of how 
binding agreements w ith the government would be if a 
major accident occurred, and of the potential for future 
international legislation – such as that proposed to the EU 
and to the Arctic Council – to override national jurisdictions.
As the appendix demonstrates, environmental regulation 
and liability in the Arctic are under scrutiny and subject 
to change. They w ill be shaped by public responses to 
recent and future cases of pollution, by evolving scientifi c 
understanding of Arctic ecosystems and by the domestic 
politics of the resource holders.
xlvi This limit is set by the US Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and does not apply to civil and 
criminal penalties under federal and state law, oil spill removal costs under federal law, or 
claims for damages brought under state law. 
xlvii In Canada, higher amounts of liability could be sought under the Fisheries Act w ith the 
civil liabilities provisions not subject to any limitations. Amos and Daller, 2010. 
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As exploration for hydrocarbons moves into ever 
remoter regions of the Arctic, the harsh environment 
presents many cha llenges and risks for drilling 
operators. Ma inta ining we ll integrity is essentia l for 
drilling and producing operations. In the Arctic, drilling 
through permafrost in the rock can be cha llenging 
as the heat of the circulating drilling fl uids (known as 
mud) can cause the permafrost to me lt, removing the 
compe tency of the formations upon which the we ll 
foundations (casing and cements) re ly, destabilising 
the we ll, and potentia lly leading to a blowout. During 
the producing phase the heat of the produced fl uids 
can have a sim ilar e ffect.
The diffi culties involved in drilling in the Arctic may 
mean that summer drilling campa igns inadvertently 
last we ll into the more hazardous w inter season. If a 
spill did occur in the Arctic, some commentators have 
suggested that there m ight be insuffi cient resources 
and equipment to stem an out-of-control we ll 
quickly xlviii. Icebreakers are in short supply, as seen 
by the diffi culties experienced by the US Coast Guard 
in fi nding a suitable vesse l to de liver an emergency 
shipment of fue l to an isolated community in A laska 
in December 2011 98. There is a lso a shortage of 
Arctic-class mobile rigs capable of drilling re lie f we lls 
in the event of a spill. The US adm inistration’s recent 
approva l of She ll’s plan to drill in US Arctic waters only 
went ahead follow ing the subm ission of an emergency 
plan that included a fl ee t of 6 oil-spill response vesse ls, 
box4: A rctic Dr i l l ing 
xlviii BBC News (October 2011) Arctic oil exploration: Potential riches and problems 
http:/ /www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-14728856
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as we ll as a US Coast Guard vesse l on standby near 
the rig at a ll times 99.
The harsh weather conditions in the Arctic ra ises 
questions over whe ther offshore drilling rigs can 
w ithstand its frequent severe storms. In December 
2011, the Kolskaya fl oating drilling rig capsized and 
sank while under tow during a strong storm in the Sea 
of Okhotsk (just outside the 60° defi nition used by this 
report), killing 53 people 100 and causing an insurable 
loss of over $100 m illion 101. The drilling rig was not 
carrying any oil when it sank, but there is concern that 
sim ilar severe Arctic weather could destabilise other 
insta llations that store signifi cant quantities of oil (such 
as FPSOs xlix), causing an environmenta l disaster 102. The 
disaster a lso showed how cold waters dramatica lly 
reduce the chance of surviva l of any crew. 
Damage caused by icebergs and offshore sea ice is 
a further risk for mobile drilling rigs and, w ith me lting 
sea ice increasing the area of open waters, these rigs 
w ill need to cope w ith stronger waves. Various types 
of insta llations are used to drill in the Arctic, including 
drill ships, artifi cia l structures and ice islands. Arctic 
drilling rigs are norma lly conica l in shape at sea ice 
leve l and use stee l plates that can be up to four inches 
thick to reduce the potentia l damage. Icebreakers are 
commonly used to break up the ice around the drilling 
insta llations and many operators employ data from 
ships and sate llites to provide a rea l-time picture of 
sea ice movements 103. Personne l employed as ice 
observers on a ll vesse ls associated w ith the drilling 
operations can a lso provide a more traditiona l source 
of information. However, employing rigs that can 
be disconnected and moved rather than those that 
are fi xed in insta llation may reduce the like lihood of 
collision. F ina lly, double-hulled tankers are now the 
norm and are used to transport oil from the rigs and 
m inim ise the potentia l for pollution from a collision 
w ith an iceberg.
Technology adapted for the Arctic is a lready used in 
regions w ith sim ilar conditions, including on Sakha lin 
Island. For instance, a FPSO vesse l in New foundland 
has the capacity to disconnect the turre t and mooring 
system from the vesse l, leaving these parts submerged 
beneath the depth of the iceberg and a llow ing the 
vesse l to be moved out of its path.
Some oil companies, notably Statoil, have ra ised the 
possibility of removing the need for surface vesse ls or 
equipment at a ll and conducting a ll drilling operations 
from the seabed 104. Designs for Arctic-capable 
submarines are under way at the Norwegian Marine 
Technology Research Institute in Trondhe im to replace 
the service vesse ls that are currently still required 
to perform ma intenance on sub-sea insta llations. 
However, conducting operations on the seabed 
could mean that pollution spills go unnoticed for 
some considerable time. Those w ishing to drill in the 
Arctic w ill be required to demonstrate that they have 
e ffective disaster management plans in place. In some 
jurisdictions this may be more onerous in the Arctic 
that e lsewhere. The Canadian regulator has recently 
announced that a ll contractors w ill be required to have 
a contingency plan in place and has reaffi rmed the 
requirement that companies have the capability to drill 
a re lie f we ll to stop an out-of-control we ll during the 
same drilling season 105.
Drilling systems and sub-sea pipe lines are a lso at 
risk from submarine landslides and ice scours in the 
seabed. Mapping of the seabed of the Beaufort Sea 
has indicated unstable areas a long the 50,000 square 
kilome tres of the Beaufort continenta l she lf that could 
trigger potentia l landslides 106. Arctic regions such as 
the Nunavut territory of Canada can a lso experience 
earthquakes which could damage onshore as we ll as 
offshore facilities 107. Sim ilarly, the Geologica l Survey 
has identifi ed more than 17,000 known ice scours 
in water depths of 5–30 me tres. Iceberg scouring 
that leaves these gouges can put immense pressure 
onto pipe lines and sub-sea we llhead comple tions. 
Submerging them be low the maximum depth at which 
these scours appear is not a lways suffi cient as soil 
displacement follow ing the movement of the ice can 
be equa lly disruptive to the pipe line. 
xlix Floating Production Storage and Offl oading unit. These vesse ls are designed to 
rece ive oil from nearby platforms or rigs, process the oil and then store it ready to 
be transported via tanker or pipe line.
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box 5: Enhanced ma r ine r isks in the A rctic
Shipowners and shipping companies operating in 
the Arctic face a number of risks over and above the 
normal risks they would expect to face. First, there are 
increased risks to vesse ls ow ing to the remoteness, lack 
of infrastructure/support services and extreme weather 
conditions. Some of the factors, identifi ed by the London 
market’s Joint Hull Committee, are as follows 108: 
• Ice contact (including icebergs)
•  Prope ller, rudder and associated machinery 
damage from ice
• Grounding on uncharted rocks 
• Icing (November to March)
• Fog (worst in June and July)
• Collision
• De lay/ lack of sa lvage exacerbated by remoteness 
• Lack of information about safe ports.
These risks w ill be exacerbated by a number of 
secondary factors, which include: 
• Poor maps
• Poor hydrographic and me teorologica l data
•  Poor sate llite navigation information and 
communication problems.
Shipping companies w ill also face greater 
environmenta l risks ow ing to the potent ia l impact 
of the ir act ivit ies and operat ions on the Arct ic 
environment. As noted by the Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment Report 2009 produced through 
the Arct ic Counc il: “Whe ther it is the re lease of 
substances through em issions to a ir or d ischarges 
to water, acc identa l re lease of o il or hazardous 
cargo, d isturbances of w ild life through sound , sight , 
collisions or the introduction of invasive a lien species, 
the Arctic marine environment is especia lly vu lnerab le 
to potent ia l impacts from marine act ivity109.” The 
potent ia l impact was shown by the Exxon Va ldez 
Container ship navigating a frozen sea.
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d isaster in 1989 that occurred just w ith in the 60° 
north boundary of the Arctic used by this report. The 
resulting oil spill spread over 300 square miles, caused 
devastat ion to the prist ine environment of Prince 
William Sound and cost Exxon $4.3bn in clean-up and 
compensatory costs 110. 
The enhanced physica l risks, toge ther w ith the 
environmenta l risks, w ill lead to grea ter liab ility risks 
(and there fore potent ia l liab ility costs) inc lud ing 
po llut ion and th ird-party dea th or in jury. For examp le, 
removing bunker fue l can be more cha llenging not 
on ly because of the extreme cond it ions, but a lso 
because the heavy-duty fue l used is potent ia lly 
more po llut ing and sh ips may be carrying more fue l 
to enab le them to trade in remote loca t ions. A lso 
repa tria t ion costs for crew and passengers cou ld be 
much h igher in the Arct ic.
A specifi c risk facing shipping companies is the 
lack of charts to support safe navigation. In its 2009 
report, the Arctic Council highlighted that signifi cant 
portions of primary Arctic shipping routes do not have 
adequate charts. This is most critica l in the Canadian 
Archipe lago and the Beaufort Sea , as we ll as in 
other areas including the Kara Sea , Laptev Sea and 
East Siberian Sea a long the Northern Sea Route. The 
problems caused by lack of charts are exacerbated by 
the poor communications ne twork in the region. 
Cruise vesse ls present a particular cha llenge for 
shipowners, regulators and insurers in the Arctic. 
Specifi ca lly, larger cruise ships that are moved from 
the Caribbean, Europe or Mediterranean to operate 
in the Arctic represent a genuine cha llenge. In the 
Canadian Arctic during the summer of 2010 the Arctic 
expedition ship C lipper Adventurer grounded on a 
charted ree f. The cha llenges for passenger rescue and 
sa lvage were clear, even though this was not an ice-
re lated incident. C learly there is a need for protocols 
and strategies w ithin the cruise ship industry to tackle 
the enhanced risks in the Arctic.
Clearing up in Prince William Sound after the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989.
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3.4 Po l itica l  and reputationa l  r isk facto rs
Many of the political and reputational risk factors 
associated w ith Arctic deve lopment are common across 
frontier deve lopments. However, the political importance of 
the Arctic in domestic politics, the high international public 
profi le of the Arctic region, and the region’s environmental 
sensitivity could increase the potential impact of these 
risk factors. Leve ls of political risk vary w ide ly across the 
region, depending on the stability of the rule of law and 
quality of the legal framework, the role of government 
bodies in shaping liabilities and infl uencing outcomes 
and the perce ived like lihood of state appropriation. In 
Greenland, where oil and gas exploration has w idespread 
public support, the political risks associated w ith 
deve lopment may be considered re lative ly low. In Russia, 
where appropriation of assets and political interference 
in commercial arrangements has affected oil and gas 
investments in the past, political risk is perce ived to be 
much higher. 
Reputational risk
The high-profi le and controversial nature of Arctic 
deve lopments attracts a degree of reputational risk to 
Arctic investments, even w ithout any environmental 
or other harm be ing caused l. Should a problem occur, 
damage to a company’s reputation is like ly to extend far 
beyond the jurisdiction in which it occurs. Even if culpability 
or negligence cannot be legally proven, or if the fault is 
shown to lie w ith contractors or partners, the primary 
company’s reputation is like ly to be harmed. This could 
potentially result in closer scrutiny and political opposition 
to that company’s role in other jurisdictions, as we ll as 
possible exclusion from the jurisdiction in which the event 
occurred. The social Arctic licence-to-operate is hard to w in 
and easy to lose. 
Companies investing in the Arctic should also be mindful 
of the reputational risks of be ing seen to benefi t from 
the impacts of climate change, as once deve lopment is 
established in the Arctic it w ill become harder to take 
action to reverse the effects of climate change. With 
shareholders taking an increased interest in environment 
issues li, the decision to invest in the Arctic region may lead 
to greater shareholder scrutiny. 
Regulatory and legal risk
In jurisdictions w ith high leve ls of litigation, court action 
can be highly effective in preventing or de laying drilling. In 
northern A laska, litigation successfully prevented She ll from 
exercising its exploration rights under an offshore Arctic 
licence for several years.
l These reputational risks are w ide ly recognised by companies operating in the Arctic and 
by governments.
li  See PWC report (2011), Shareholders press boards on social and environmental risks 
http:/ /www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/CCaSS_social_environmental_risks/$FILE/
CCaSS_social_environmental_risks.pdf 
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Given the sensitivity of Arctic development, there is greater 
risk from changes in regulation or investment frameworks, 
following either a change of political leadership or a specifi c 
risk event, even one in which the company is not itse lf 
implicated. The moratoria on Arctic drilling in the United 
States and Canadian Arctic follow ing the Macondo disaster 
are a case in point. More broadly, a public and government 
reassessment of the balance between competing economic 
forces – such as between fi shing and offshore oil and gas 
deve lopment – could provoke some regulatory shift. 
Given the trans-border nature of potential environmental 
risk events, a company would have to consider not only the 
implications of a risk event in one jurisdiction, but also the 
possibility of the involvement of multiple jurisdictions. 
Domestic political risk
Political support for Arctic deve lopment, particularly in 
the mining and oil and gas sectors, varies considerably 
between and w ithin Arctic states. Leve ls of political support 
are generally high in Greenland. They are much lower in 
the US and Canada as a whole – though generally high 
in A laska and in Canadian territories that stand to gain 
employment or revenue through deve lopment. In Russia, 
central government support is critical in order to create 
tax and incentive structures that encourage the national 
strategic priority of maintaining or expanding oil and 
gas exports. As anywhere in the world, Arctic projects 
ultimate ly depend on the support of the communities and 
countries in which they operate. Without this, deve lopment 
cannot take place. 
In 2006 Royal Dutch She ll negotiated the rights to 
operate the Sakhalin II project to drill for hydrocarbons 
on the Russian-owned Sakhalin Island. However, Russian 
regulators then claimed to have found environmental 
inconsistencies that required the suspension of the project. 
It has been suggested that She ll was then put in a position 
whereby it needed to se ll its majority stake in the project 
to Russian-owned Gazprom in order to “resolve” the 
environmental diffi culties and to maintain the She ll license 
in the region 111. A lthough Sakhalin is not located w ithin the 
Arctic as defi ned by our report, the uncertain political and 
regulatory environment means that a previously agreed 
drilling licence could be confi scated in any number of the 
hydrocarbon fi e lds in the Arctic region. 
Geopolitical risk
Operations in the Arctic are exposed to the same range 
of political and geopolitical risks as in other parts of the 
world, including terrorism, though these are re lative ly much 
lower than in some frontier areas of deve lopment. For the 
foreseeable future, all offshore deve lopments w ill take 
place in areas that are unlike ly to be subject to territorial 
dispute between Arctic states. 
However, in addition to the uncertainties outlined in section 
2.5 there are a number of scenarios that could lead to 
dispute, draw ing in or directly affecting private companies:
 
•  If exploration licences were granted in the disputed 
areas of the Beaufort Sea, companies that began active 
drilling in that area could fi nd themse lves exposed to 
political disagreement between the US and Canada. 
•  If the Svalbard authorities allowed exploration and 
drilling for oil near the Svalbard archipe lago on terms 
that signatories considered to be in breach of the 
Svalbard treaty, then geopolitical tensions might rise, 
w ith consequences for investors. 
•  In a situation of military tension between Arctic states, 
whether resulting from Arctic political disagreements 
or from a spillover from non-Arctic geopolitical 
competition, Arctic installations might be exposed.
•  Terrorist actions could target Arctic installations 
w ith substantial commercial and environmental 
consequences.
However, at the time of writing, these are re lative ly 
unlike ly scenarios. Managing and mitigating them depends 
on additional state surve illance of land, sea and air 
communication and co-operation between the military forces 
of Arctic countries, adequate constabulary capability across 
the Arctic, a clear understanding between Arctic states 
of the scale and role of military forces and, in extremis, 
suffi cient military forces to protect economic assets. 
For Arctic shipping the political and geopolitical risks are 
somewhat different. Disagreement over the legal status 
of the Northwest Passage and potentially over the status 
of Russian Arctic waters could lead to claims that double 
standards are be ing applied, or to claims of a contravention 
of the Law of the Sea (LOS) provisions, including those 
re lating to “ice-covered waters” 112. To the extent that Arctic 
states – particularly Canada and Russia – seek to apply 
special regulations on shipping in the Arctic, above and 
beyond any internationally agreed conventions, there is 
scope for disagreement lii.
lii This would include regimes such as the Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 
(AWPPA) which place additional requirements on shipping in Arctic Waters.
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3.5 Managing r isk
Given the complex and often unique risk challenges of 
the Arctic described above, all interested parties need to 
adopt a cautious and highly risk-aware approach to Arctic 
deve lopment. 
Governments – singly and together – have an essential 
role in setting acceptable risk thresholds, monitoring 
activity and ensuring that know ledge gaps are suffi ciently 
addressed. They w ill need to ensure that an integrated 
ecosystem-based approach is taken to deve lopment, to 
avoid the impacts of one activity harming and displacing 
others. They w ill also need to take full account of the 
cumulative impacts of deve lopment, as opposed to the 
impacts of a single project. Governments should insist 
upon a safety-case, rather than a prescriptive, approach to 
risk management liii.
Where activity takes place, corporate risk management is 
fundamental for companies to work safe ly, sustainably and 
successfully. As this report has emphasised, there is a w ide 
range of Arctic operating environments that present greater 
or lesser operational and other risks, but many parts of 
the Arctic remain extreme. Practices and technologies 
w ill need to be continuously updated to refl ect a rapidly 
changing situation, and to ensure that best practice is 
constantly improved and consistently applied. 
Though much research is ongoing and experience from 
outside the Arctic region may prove useful to operations within 
it, considerable further research and analysis are required 
to fully assess the range of hazards of Arctic operations 
and the vulnerabilities of technical systems, equipment and 
the Arctic environment to disruption and harm. 
Be low we consider the main risk management approaches 
– risk governance, risk mitigation and risk transfer – 
principally from a corporate perspective, and principally 
w ith re levance to the oil, gas, mining and logistics sectors liv. 
3.5.1 Risk governance
Firms arguably do not need to recreate the ir risk 
management frameworks for the Arctic context. They 
w ill need to ensure, however, that these frameworks take 
account of the complex and fast-changing nature of the 
Arctic risk environment.
Company boards need to be fully engaged in the risk 
management process and to ensure that a risk culture 
is embedded across the organisation, from business 
planning to clear communication of risk issues. Governance 
frameworks should include clear procedures for risk 
identifi cation, assessment and analysis, and control, as we ll 
as action planning and reporting. 
Companies also need to think through possible worst-
case scenarios and deve lop plans both to prevent these 
occurring, and to respond if the worst did happen. These 
plans should include clear and robust action plans for 
crisis management as we ll as strategies and approaches to 
manage any reputational damage. 
liv Much of the material in this section is derived from risk experts within the Lloyd’s market.
liii A safety-case approach involves management presenting information show ing that 
it has considered all risks re levant to its specifi c operation and has detailed how it w ill 
avoid or manage these risks. This is in contrast to a prescriptive regime where regulators 
defi ne what operators must do to comply and there is no requirement for management 
to do more than what is prescribed.
Greenland’s frozen landscape.
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While management of reputational risk necessarily remains 
the exclusive responsibility of companies themse lves, 
crisis-management plans for Arctic operations should 
be e ither available to public authorities or published to 
ensure public oversight, maintain public trust, and make 
companies fully accountable for the ir actions.
3.5.2 Risk mitigation
There are a number of ways in which companies can 
mitigate some of the risks of operating in the Arctic. Many 
of these w ill be techniques and approaches adapted 
from other regions, particularly those where extreme cold 
conditions are the norm. However, some w ill be unique to 
Arctic conditions. 
The deve lopment and implementation of best-in-class 
safety and operational standards at both corporate and 
industry-w ide leve l are crucial. The deve lopment of ISO 
standards – such as ISO 19906: 2010 covering Arctic 
offshore structures for the oil and gas industry, and 
the deve lopment of an IMO polar shipping code – are 
good examples of this. While learning from experience 
e lsewhere, these refl ect the complexity and sensitivity of 
the Arctic risk environment. 
Offshore, there are a number of practical operational steps 
and actions that companies operating in the Arctic can take 
to mitigate risk. Ice preparedness and ice management 
– from ice-drift maps to sate llite tracking – are key. 
There are also various practical actions that energy and 
shipping companies can take once operations are under 
way, including detection of icebergs by radar, aerial and 
vesse l reconnaissance, icebreaker support and physical 
management in the form of tow ing vesse ls out of danger or 
using water cannons.
Companies can also mitigate risks by adopting the latest, 
Arctic-specifi c technologies, materials and processes, 
including drill rigs and the latest ice-class vesse ls. Indeed, 
some of the extreme environmental factors experienced in 
the Arctic can be mitigated through the design process.
Finally, as mentioned earlier, if all the above fails, 
companies must deve lop response plans for the full range 
of hazard events, including under-ice blowout and pollution.
3.5.3 The role of risk transfer 
While corporate risk management in the Arctic should 
focus on risk mitigation, any robust and comprehensive 
risk management strategy should also consider transferring 
some risks to a third party through insurance. A number 
of specialist insurers have provided insurance cover in 
extreme conditions, including the Arctic. Insurance should 
not only be seen as fi nancial protection. Rigorous insurance 
processes can promote improved risk management w ithin 
a company, reducing risk before the event as we ll as 
managing the cost of actual risk events to a company.
We briefl y outline the current outlook for insurance in three 
main areas – marine insurance, energy industry insurance 
and political risk. 
Marine insurance 
The maritime insurance industry can play a critical role 
in reducing risk for shipping companies in the Arctic, as 
e lsewhere. If insurers are unable to cover shipping through 
the Arctic, or if rates for insurance cover are exceptionally 
high, the economic viability of some Arctic shipping may be 
brought into question. This has broad implications for other 
industry sectors re liant on maritime logistics – including 
natural resource deve lopment. 
Insurers are currently he lping to improve the safety and 
raise awareness of the Arctic shipping routes, by providing 
information and encouraging effective risk-mitigation 
measures and safer vesse ls. The website of the London 
market’s Joint Hull Committee (JHC), Navigating Limits 
Sub-Committee is a good resource for shipping companies 
An icebreaker creates a channe l.
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and insurers operating in the Arctic w ith wordings, recent 
incidents, links and ice maps 113. Though commercial 
maritime interest in the Arctic is grow ing, the current take-
up of Arctic specifi c insurance is currently limited by the 
re lative ly small numbers of vesse l voyages per year.
The key issues of concern for underwriters when 
considering the Arctic are: remoteness, lack of rescue 
and salvage facilities, whether a vesse l to be insured 
is suffi ciently ice-classed for expected conditions and 
whether it w ill rece ive icebreaker support. The JHC 
highlighted the need for underwriters to satisfy themse lves 
on the follow ing points, as a minimum:
• Voyage feasibility study, including ports of refuge.
• Suitability of the vesse l for the intended voyage.
• Proposed route, dates and timing.
•  Crew ing arrangements including key personne l’s leve ls 
of experience in Arctic navigation lv.
• Icebreaker and/or escort arrangements.
•  Access to accurate and up-to-date weather/ ice 
information during the voyage.
• Assessment of chart accuracy.
• Whether an ice pilot w ill be on board. 
• Bunkering arrangements.
The main types of insurance for vesse ls in the Arctic are 
Hull (including Increased Value lvi), Cargo and P&I (Marine 
Liability):
 
•  There is like ly to be an additional Arctic premium for 
hull insurance and/or an additional voyage-specifi c ice 
deductible, based on a loading of the standard annual 
Navigating premium for a particular time period (such 
as the length of the voyage). The ability to insure w ill 
depend on how far the responses to the points above 
satisfy Hull underwriters. 
•  The market w ill not charge additional premiums for 
cargo for Arctic trade under a worldw ide policy. For a 
specifi c cargo, perce ived additional Arctic exposure is 
like ly to be taken into account in the original rating.
iv The JHC also advise that it can be he lpful for ships using the Northern Sea Route to 
have a Russian-speaking desk offi cer on board. 
lvi This is a separate product written in the hull market, which covers assets other than 
hull itse lf such as bunkers.
Bow of an icebreaking vesse l.
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lvii The International Group of P & I clubs (IGA) are a pool that retains the fi rst layer of 
marine liability losses (currently $60m), w ith the excess be ing placed as re insurance in 
several insurance markets, and led in Lloyd’s. There is insurance in place for up to $1bn 
for pollution and $3bn for death and bodily injury to passengers and crew.
•  The potential costs of Marine Liability risks – wreck 
removal, pollution, and death and bodily injury to 
passengers and crew – w ill be enhanced and are like ly 
to be much more severe events in the Arctic ow ing to 
the remote and harsh environment lvii.
Insurance for the energy industry
Insurance is currently provided for a range of risks within the 
energy industry, from physical loss and damage to property, 
removal of wreck and evacuation expenses, business 
interruption and loss of production income, liabilities for 
death and bodily injury to employees, third parties and third-
party property damage and construction risks. 
Insurance is also provided for Control of We ll and a range 
of Operators’ Extra Expenses (OEE) w ith re levance to the 
Arctic offshore, in particular: 
•  Covering a blowout that requires control to be 
regained. This may include expenditures for hiring 
mobile drilling rigs to drill re lief we lls. In Canada, 
operators are required to have a second mobile drilling 
rig standing by, greatly increasing the cost.
•  Re-drilling or extended re-drilling of we lls, making them 
safe or plugging and abandoning them. 
•  Covering seepage and pollution, essentially from a 
blowout, though it has been possible to extend cover 
to include pollution from the production facility itse lf, 
provided the origina l cause of loss is a blowout. The 
agreement covers lega l liability, the costs of clean-
up (whe ther or not there is lega l liability) and lega l 
de fence costs lviii.
As w ith maritime cover, insurance capacity for the energy 
industry is not unlimited. Cover is offered for risks in return 
for appropriate premiums and on specifi ed terms and 
conditions 114. Areas of cover may clash, and insurers w ill 
have the ir own maximum limits for which they w ill offer 
capacity lix. There may be many parties involved in a drilling 
operation, from the operator (and any joint operators) 
to the service companies, contractors and equipment 
providers (including the provider of a blowout preventer). 
Insurers may be covering several of these parties and 
w ill therefore need to manage any potential aggregations 
of risk. Geographic aggregation of risks can also occur if 
limited accessibility in the Arctic forces companies to focus 
operations in one place, for instance through the use of 
extended reach we lls lx. Managing risk in the offshore Arctic 
and insuring it is like ly to be costly. Risk criteria w ill be set 
much higher than in other offshore areas, such as the 
lviii The insured has autonomy to act quickly to try to prevent pollution reaching the shore.
lix Clashing exposures include physical loss and damage to assets such as platforms or 
mobile rigs, control of we ll, and operators’ extra expense and pollution liability. 
lx Extended reach drilling refers to the directional drilling of very long horizontal we lls.
Oil worker on a Russian drilling rig.
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North Sea, as the consequences of an event could be much 
worse. Lower risk criteria would reduce operational costs 
for energy companies, but increase the risk to insurers. 
Cover provided by a typical OEE policy 
•  Control of we ll: this is effective ly a blowout, requiring 
regain of control, and may, at worst, include costs for 
hiring mobile drilling rigs to drill re lief we lls. 
•  Re-drill: typically this follows a blowout; when a we ll is 
brought under control it may need to be re-drilled, or 
restored to its condition prior to the blowout. The costs 
incurred are in respect of re-drilling to the depth at 
which control was lost. 
•  Extended re-drill: this covers costs to re-drill or restore 
we lls that have been lost as a result of damage to 
production infrastructure. 
•  Making we lls safe: this re lates to a physical loss or 
damage to the platform and involves sub-surface 
activity to make the we ll safe. 
•  P&A: the requirement to plug and abandon a we ll 
could result from physical loss or damage to the 
platform. 
•  Seepage and pollution: coverage under the policy 
is triggered by pollution from we lls resulting from 
blowouts, and not pollution from other facilities and 
resulting from other causes. The insuring agreement is 
in three main parts: 
 1.  Legal liability, or liability incurred under a lease 
block contract, for damages in respect of third-
party property damage and injury. 
 2.  Costs incurred by the insured to clean up, or 
attempt to clean up, seeping, polluting and 
contaminating substances. This second part 
does not require legal liability. The insured has 
autonomy to act quickly to try to prevent pollution 
reaching the shore. 
 3. In addition the policy covers legal defence costs. 
These coverage provisions are based on a pollution 
incident that is sudden and accidental and for which notice 
provisions are incorporated into the policy.
Political risk
A company may invest in the Arctic economy only to 
fi nd that its investment is threatened ow ing to changes 
in commercial interests, regulatory obstacles or political 
change. It may be possible to transfer these risks to the 
insurance market through specialist political risk products.
Two main groupings back up this class; Contract Frustration 
and Confi scation, Expropriation and Nationalisation (CEN)
•  Most standard commercial property covers exclude 
damage following government actions. CEN can fi ll this 
gap and protect companies from fi nancial loss, perhaps 
following the passage of new laws that make the 
operating environment unviable, following destruction 
of assets by the state and confi scation, or following 
government expropriation and nationalisation. When 
there are a series of acts by the government that slowly 
ensures deterioration in the operating environment this 
can also be included in cover and is often referred to as 
“creeping expropriation”. 
•  In the Arctic, due to the geopolitical dynamics of 
the region, coverage for war, terrorism and forced 
abandonment can be added to a CEN policy. Forced 
abandonment cover ensures the insured is protected 
against a situation where the security environment 
deteriorates and it becomes no longer safe to operate 
with the Insured abandoning their property. A third 
party analyst is often required to confi rm that this is the 
case and the property will have to be abandoned for a 
continuous period of 180 days for a claim to be paid.
•  Some insurers offer contract frustration cover, which 
provides coverage for a loss under a contract or 
agreement follow ing a political event beyond the 
control of the insured. A sovere ignty dispute leading 
to the invalidation of a previously purchased offshore 
drilling licence would be considered an insurable risk 
under a contract frustration policy. Coverage could also 
extend to ensure an indemnity is paid if the royalties 
or taxes are amended. Environmental issues, however, 
might be excluded. Unfair and/or politically fair calling 
of bond cover is often added as an extension to 
contract frustration if the contract is especially large.
With a ll these products, it is usua l for the insurer to 
require evidence from the insured that they have 
authorisation for the ir licenses to operate in the region. 
Politica l risk insurance a lso re lies on clear ownership of 
asse ts and contracts. To the extent that there may be 
lega l uncerta inty around the fi na l position of sovere ignty 
over some parts of the Arctic, underwriters w ill like ly be 
re luctant to offer cover.
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• •   Investment in science and research – both by government agencies and by private companies – is essential 
to close know ledge gaps, reduce uncertainties and manage risks. Arctic econom ic deve lopment can only 
proceed at a rate that takes into account these factors, that can be measured against environmental base lines 
and that recognises the primary role of governments in setting frameworks and establishing public policy 
priorities. Further research is required to ensure future deve lopment takes place sustainably and does not cause 
irreparable damage to the environment.
•   Major investment is required in infrastructure and surve illance to enable safe econom ic activity. In many areas – 
shipping, search and rescue – infrastructure is currently insuffi cient to meet the expected demands of econom ic 
deve lopment. Public/private co-operation is needed to provide this infrastructure. 
•   Full-scale exercises based on worst-case scenarios of environmental disaster should be run by companies 
w ith government involvement and oversight to provide a transparent account of the state of know ledge and 
capabilities, to foster expertise and to assuage legitimate public concerns. 
•   Companies have a responsibility and interest in establishing industry-w ide standards and expectations for safety 
and stewardship, through the Arctic Council, through the International Maritime Organisation or through industry 
associations. Failure by one company w ill have impacts for others. 
•   Integrated ecosystem-based management, incorporating the full range of econom ic factors, is needed in 
order to avoid one activity harm ing and displacing others and to take full account of the cumulative impacts 
of deve lopment. Long-term viability should be a key policy consideration for governments, business and other 
stakeholders. 
•   The mosaic of regulations and governments in the Arctic creates a multi-jurisdictional challenge for investment 
and operations in the Arctic. Working through the Arctic Council to promote high and common regulations 
for Arctic econom ic activity is key. Both domestic legislation and international agreements should adopt a 
safety-case analysis rather than a prescriptive approach to risk management. States should provide strong 
and transparent oversight through appropriate government agencies, aligning risks and incentives for private 
companies w ith the broader public interest, and ensuring that private econom ic interests do not overcome 
legitimate public concerns.
•   Governments should be clear about the purpose and scope of m ilitary activities in the Arctic, so as to prevent 
m isunderstanding or m iscalculations from deve loping. At the same time, additional state policing capacity in the 
Arctic – to police and protect – should be broadly we lcomed. 
•   Given the extreme and fast-changing risks facing companies in the Arctic, robust risk management approaches 
w ill be vital to allow sustainable econom ic deve lopment and to ensure that all stakeholders can benefi t from 
econom ic opportunities. In addition to embedding a risk culture throughout the organisation, adopting best 
practice standards and implementing practical risk m itigation measures, any comprehensive risk management 
approach is like ly to consider transferring risks as a key part of the strategy.
4. CONCLUSIONS
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appendix
Environmental Regulation of Arctic offshore oil and gas activities
Russia Norway US Canada Denmark & Greenland Iceland
Ministry of Natural 
Resources and 
Environment (MNRE)
Rosnedra (federal agency 
for subsoil usage)
Rosprirodnadzor (federal 
service for supervising of 
the use of natural 
resources)
Strict environmental codes; 
though historically irregular 
application. 
Concerns about 
politicisation of 
enforcement.
MNREP’s approval of 
project’s Environmental 
Impact Assessment
Unlimited liability; civil, 
administrative and/or 
criminal.
Non-compliance can lead 
to fines or suspension of 
operations at the discretion 
of independent inspector.
Federal Law on the Russian 
Arctic Zone 2012 to identify 
Arctic territories as unique 
objects of state policy 
regarding socio-economic 
and environmental 
legislation; new 
Russia-Norway 
collaborative partnership 
launched in 2012, to 
include an environmental 
working group.
Greater public objections 
to sub-sea drilling in Arctic 
follow ing sinking of 
offshore platform in the 
White Sea in May 2011.
There are currently no 
companies w ith 
exploration and production 
licences on the Ice landic 
Continental She lf. A second 
licensing round opened in 
October 2011.
30-year moratorium on oil 
production in the Lofoten, 
Vesteraalen and Senja 
islands in the Norwegian 
Sea extended until 2013. 
Contested issue 
domestically.
Currently no offshore 
drilling; NEB conducting a 
post-Deepwater Horizon 
review of licensing 
requirements. New filing 
requirements re leased 
December 2011, which 
also pertain to companies 
already holding licences in 
the Beaufort Sea.
New management tool 
(Petroleum and 
Environmental 
Management Tool) 
mapping ecological and 
social parameters 
introduced by AANDC in 
2009 to improve future 
consultation process.
Governments working 
w ithin the Arctic Council to 
support an international 
instrument for offshore oil 
exploration/exploitation 
liability and compensation.
Moratorium post-Macondo 
eased in August 2011 as 
conditional approval 
granted to a couple of 
IOCs. 
Environmental challenges 
de laying and/or 
complicating operations in 
Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, 
including DoI’s listing of the 
polar bear as an 
endangered species. 
Next round of leases 
scheduled for 2015/16, 
pending Environmental 
Impact Assessments and 
infrastructure 
assessments; currently 
area-w ide but BOEMRE 
deve loping leasing system 
specific to local 
environmental conditions.
Unlimited liability. In event 
of pollution damage, 
licensee liable to those 
affected w ithout regard to 
fault. Liability can be 
reduced if force majeure 
event contributed. Claims 
can be pursued through 
district courts. Special 
compensation allowed for 
Norwegian fishermen.
Civil and criminal liability; 
offshore spill liability 
capped at $75m/ incident 
unless fault or gross 
negligence established. 
Not applicable to 
regulatory violations or 
claims for damages 
brought under state law. 
Ascription of liability 
ambiguous.
Liability capped at 
CAN$40m unless fault or 
negligence is established. 
Fisheries Act can also 
apply. Civil damages have 
no upper limit.
Unlimited liability, even in 
“accidental” cases. 
Compensation calculated 
proportionate to event. 
Details unclear. Operator or 
licensee may be he ld liable, 
regardless of whether loss 
or damage was caused by 
culpable conduct or not. 
Act of God or war 
exempted. 
Authorization of 
Compliance on technical 
and management 
capacities, Environmental 
Impact Assessment, 
emergency preparedness 
report. 
Seasonal restrictions may 
apply according to 
spawning and migration 
periods.
Multidimensional, 
implementation and 
on-going revision of Safety 
and Environmental 
Management System and 
emergency preparedness 
report.
Plan of Co-operation w ith 
indigenous communities, 
8% tax/barre l paid into Oil 
Spill Liability Trust Fund. 
Company must 
demonstrate financial 
capability of up to $150m
Emergency preparedness 
report, Certificate of 
Fitness per installation.
Proven capacity to drill 
same-season response 
we ll. Exemption allowed 
for companies that can 
demonstrate ability to 
achieve intended outcome 
by alternative means per 
2011 NEB review. 
To be awarded an 
exploration licence, 
company must have equity 
of at least US$10bn. 
Guarantee of financial 
responsibility in the form of 
bond or insurance 
certificate.
Certification of fitness per 
installation and vesse l, 
documented management 
capabilities, Environmental 
Impact Assessment and 
Social Impact Assessment 
EIA and public 
announcement of the ir 
results.
On-going comprehensive 
environmental regulation 
and obligatory 
Environmental Impact 
Assessments.
A ims to balance interests 
of fisheries and oil and gas 
sectors. CO2 emissions tax.
Sector- and 
objective-specific 
mandates w ithin a ‘culture 
of safety’.
Incorporation of industry 
standards advised where 
regulatory requirements 
are imprecise.
Case-by-case 
consideration of each 
company’s safety plan.
Integrated process 
incorporating ‘dynamic 
interpretation’ of Mineral 
Resources Act.
Burden of proof on 
investor to demonstrate 
adherence to international 
best practices.
Standards set by MoIET on 
a case-by-case basis.
 
Obligatory Special Safety 
Zone around all offshore 
installations.
Norwegian Ministry of the 
Environment (MD)
Norwegian Climate and 
Pollution Agency (Klif)
Norwegian Ministry of 
Health and Social Affairs 
(SHD)
Norwegian Pollution 
Control Authority (SFT)
Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate (NPD)
Department of the Interior 
(DoI)
Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management, Regulation 
and Enforcement 
(BOEMRE)
Bureau of Safety and 
Environmental 
Enforcement (BSEE)
US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA)
National Energy Board 
(NEB)
Canada-Newfoundland and 
Labrador Offshore 
Petroleum Board 
(C-NLOPB) 
Aboriginal Affairs and 
Northern Deve lopment 
Canada (AANDC)
BMP, GINR, NERI, DNEI
Bureau of Minerals and 
Petrol (BMP)
Greenland Institute for 
Natural Resources (GINR)
National Environmental 
Research Institute (NERI)
National Energy Authority 
(NEA)
Ministry of Industry, Energy 
and Tourism (MoIET)
Sources:  A laska Offshore, The Arctic Council, Barents Observer, Be llona, BMP (Denmark) BOEMRE (US), Goltsblat BLP, Government of Greenland, International Law Office, 
Oil and Gas Journal, MNRE (Russia), NEB (Canada), NPD (Norway), NRCan (Canada), The Pembina Institute, Tulane University, University of Ottowa-Ecojustice Environmental Law Clinic, 
Vermont Law School.
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